I examine long-term employment and wage consequences for refugees who immigrate to the United States under different business cycle conditions. It is difficult to causally identify the relationship between initial economic conditions and subsequent outcomes for most immigrants because they can choose when and where they immigrate. However , refugees offer a unique opportunity to empirically measure these outcomes because their dates of arrival and states of placement are exogenously chosen through the US Refugee Resettlement Program. For every one percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at arrival, refugees on average experience a 2.99% reduction in wages five years later and a 1.8 percentage point reduction in employment four years later. Estimates using state unemployment rate at arrival show less persistence suggesting mobility or differential economic improvement across states may be important in mitigating these effects. I also divide the sample across gender and educational attainment. I find no evidence of wage scarring for uneducated males but observe a 4.85% reduction in wages five years later for high school-educated males and a 5.29% reduction in wages four years later for college-educated males.

The plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) is regarded by many as a viable alternative to the internal combustion engine, so long as the radical technology is able to overcome technical and financial shortcomings that dictate consumer acceptance. States have instituted a variety of policies aimed at mitigating these shortcomings and simultaneously increasing consumer demand for PEV vehicles. Motivated by a limited body of literature on the effects of these policies, and a significant need for information about policy efficacy, in this study we evaluate the relationship between a suite of state-level policies and PEV registrations. Results reveal that tax credits for individuals, grants programs for charging infrastructure and PEV purchases, and incentives for state-owned PEVs fleets increase PEV registrations. The observed impact of grant incentives is mediated by charging capacity or, alternatively phrased, much of the influence of grants on registrations is through the channel of first improving the charging infrastructure within a state. ■ INTRODUCTION The plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) is a classic case of a radical technology. It is touted for its potential to compete with, and potentially displace, the internal combustion engine (ICE) as a dominant vehicle technology. As with other "radical" technologies, 1 however, this technological shift will require a confluence of policy, infrastructural, and behavioral developments in its favor. Generally speaking, scholars interested in the adoption and diffusion of product innovations have long recognized that government policies can encourage shifts in consumer preferences toward them. 2−4 Work on radical technologies suggest that these "pushes" from government are particularly important when an innovation represents something truly new or radical to the current technological regime with which consumers are familiar. 5,6 The first mass-marketed PEVs hit the U.S. automobile market in 2010. As of 2016, the stock of PEVs had grown to 563 710, 7 with uneven distributions of these vehicles across states. A number of factors are known to dissuade potential consumers from adopting PEVs, including cost, range, and battery recharging requirements. 8,9 PEVs tend to have an upfront cost that is 50 to 100% higher than that of similar internal combustion engine vehicles, though the level of subsidies offered by government affects what the consumer pays. 8 The range of most current PEVs on a fully charged battery without a hybrid engine is typically between 70 and 100 miles, significantly less than the 250-to 350-mile range of a conventional ICE. These distance limitations contribute to "range anxiety," 8 a fear that one's battery will die when on the road. Finally, PEVs require specific charging infrastructure that must be installed in an owner's home or an accessible public facility. Previous work on the intent to purchase PEVs 10 find that perceptions of these disadvantages damage consumer interest in adoption more than any other factor. States and municipalities have adopted a number of policies designed to overcome these barriers and facilitate PEV consumption, though the policy response varies considerably across jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, there have been a number of studies of the relationship between these policy incentives and the spread of PEVs, but these studies have reached mixed conclusions about policy impacts (see refs 11 and 12 for a recent review of many of these studies). A number of studies have also surveyed consumers and potential consumers in order to understand the impact of policies (see, for example, refs 13 and 14), and this methodological approach has also produced mixed conclusions. However, in the interest of brevity, we will only provide a partial review of studies that examine policy impact using statistical analyses to predict actual PEV purchases or registrations. Several studies have focused exclusively on the most prominent policy incentives for PEV purchasedirect financial incentives and charging infrastructure. Sierzchula et al. 15 find that both are important, but that neither has a particularly large impact on PEV purchases. Lutsey et al. 16 identify an interactive effect between these variables,

The Hispanic Mortality Paradox (HMP) refers to an advantage in life expectancy among Hispanic immigrants (relative to U.S.-born groups) despite lower socioeconomic attainment. The HMP has been well-documented (Riosmena et al. 2015; Riosmena, Wong, and Palloni 2013b): Hispanic immigrants experience a survival advantage-e.g., three-year advantage over U.S.-born whites (Goldman 2016)-compared to U.S.-born counterparts. However, today's institutional context differs sharply from earlier eras when evidence of the paradox first emerged. Thirty years after the 1980s overhaul of immigration law, Hispanic immigrants-including two-thirds of unauthorized immigrants-are now a long-term, settled population (Taylor et al. 2011). Among Hispanic noncitizens, the possibility of deportation has grown rapidly, while Hispanics have also become concentrated in dangerous jobs (Hall and Greenman 2015) with limited health access (Perreira and Pedroza 2019). In this paper, we explore the paradox among Hispanic immigrants surveyed between 2000 and 2016 to determine whether and where the previously observed advantages to longevity may be losing ground. We pay particular attention to trends in recent years because of the sudden rise in deportations since the early 2000s. First, we use Census data to examine rates of disability among Hispanic immigrants. Then, we present estimated death counts as a function of disability and health indicators. Finally, we describe disability rates and death counts across divergent policy contexts. At one end of the spectrum are places where cooperation with immigration authorities was common, exposing Hispanic immigrants to heightened exclusion. By contrast, other places limited the reach of immigration enforcement. By examining disability and preventable death in divergent contexts, we call attention to the indirect determinants of health in an era of mass deportations. Disability and health data: We analyze American Community Survey (ACS) data on self-reported disability (Ruggles et al. 2018). The data provide prevalence estimates for six measures of disability (i.e., cognitive, ambulatory, independent living, self-care, vision, or hearing difficulty). Among metro residents in 2016, 12.5% report at least of one these disabilities, 5.9% report two or more difficulties, and 3.3% report three or more. Respondents also report health insurance status. By 2016, 91.4% of metro residents report having any health insurance, up from 85.5% in 2012. Among those with insurance coverage in 2016, 57.7% only had private insurance, 21.6% only had public insurance, and 12.0% had both. Deportation data: This paper measures cumulative deportation rates [Figure 1] to capture the variation across metro areas in immigration enforcement under the Secure Communities

In 1971, economist Barbara Bergmann developed the “occupational crowding model,” which posited that black men are “crowded into” low-wage occupations and “crowded out” of high-wage occupations due to employer discrimination. In quantitative analyses I have conducted for the years 2010 through 2011, the results have yielded a different picture from what Bergmann’s model predicts: although African American men are underrepresented in high-wage occupations, consistent with her model, this group does not appear to be overrepresented in low-wage occupational categories when the level of analysis is between major low-wage occupational categories instead of within categories. I attribute this to demographic changes in the US labor force, and conclude by suggesting that the model now requires further specification.

Much debate exists about the benefits of state-funded merit scholarships in bridging the opportunity gap between those who can and cannot afford quality post-secondary education. This paper employs a difference in difference methodology to analyze the relationship between state-funded, merit scholarships and economic mobility in thirteen states. It also investigates other short-term outcomes such as college completion and college enrollment, long-term outcomes such as income, and government spending at the state level. This study finds that state-funded merit aid has small and statistically insignificant impacts on overall economic mobility within states. However, statistically significant evidence suggests that these scholarships lead to a small reduction in college enrollment for African-Americans. Moreover, lottery-funded merit scholarships are estimated to have an adverse effect on employment benefits for state residents in the short term. This finding suggests that the use of lottery revenues for scholarships detracts from other forms of government spending that might otherwise benefit the poor and unemployed. Finally, there is suggestive evidence that merit aid has the greatest adverse effect on income for the bottom 25th percentile of earners, but benefits the top quartile of earners. Overall, the findings imply that merit scholarships may exacerbate wealth inequality by crowding out minorities and low-income students from in-state campuses, and in some cases, diverting resources away from government assistance programs.

Objectives To understand nationwide concurrent use of e‐cigarettes (Ecig) with alcohol and conventional cigarettes (Ccig), the major risk factors for head and neck cancer. Study Design Cross‐sectional analysis of nationally representative survey. Methods The National Health Interview Surveys for 2014 and 2015 were analyzed for adult responses to specific questions regarding the daily frequency of alcohol, Ccig, and Ecig use. Statistical relationships between these social habits were determined. Results A total of 241.1 million adults (raw N = 162,048) were surveyed (mean age 47.1 years, 51.8% female). Of those, 12.1% (29.2 million) and 3.8% (9.08 million) reported being every day Ccig users and some days Ccig users, respectively. A total of 2.3% (5.63 million) and 1.1% (2.76 million) reported being every day Ecig users and some days Ecig users, respectively. In addition, 58.4% of everyday Ecig users reported also being everyday Ccig users (P < 0.001). Furthermore, 25.6% (61.3 million) and 8.3% (20.0 million) of adults reported light drinking (1–3 drinks/week) and moderate/heavy drinking (4–7 drinks/week), respectively. Of the moderate/heavy drinkers, 17.7% were everyday Ccig users, whereas 12.2% of everyday Ccig users were moderate/heavy drinkers (P < 0.001). Among everyday Ecig users, 34.6% and 11.2% were light drinkers and moderate/heavy drinkers, respectively (P < 0.001). Among non‐Ccig users, everyday Ecig users were likely to consume higher levels of alcohol given that 36.5% and 8.9% were light drinkers and moderate/heavy drinkers, respectively (P < 0.01). Conclusion We demonstrate a substantial level of Ccig use among moderate/heavy drinkers and Ecig users, as well as a novel independent association between Ecig and moderate/heavy alcohol use. These patterns of concurrent risk factor exposure should be considered when counseling patients who report Ecig use.

Congestion pricing could reduce urban congestion, but might disproportionately benefit the affluent and burden the poor. We show that this common concern also applies to free roads. Free urban highways primarily subsidize richer people, and the resulting congestion creates pollution that disproportionately burdens poorer people. Furthermore, the poor drivers burdened by peak-hour road pricing would be a small minority of total peak-hour drivers and a minority of the poor. These facts suggest that the revenue generated by pricing could compensate any poor drivers harmed. Free roads, in contrast, generate no revenue to compensate the people they harm.

There has been considerable media coverage highlighting the lack of gender diversity in Silicon Valley, stressing the relatively low participation of women in the high-tech economy. Austin offers a unique case for testing whether similar gender issues characterized other high-tech regions because the city has historically benefited from the expansion of Silicon Valley’s large high-tech firms since the 1980s. The gender-biased business practices identified in Silicon Valley firms may have been transferred to their branch plants in Austin. Our analysis shows women’s losses in middle-skill occupation employment shares were concentrated in the low-tech industry and were partially offset by job share gains in high-skill occupations in the same sector between 1980 and 2015. Men’s losses in middle-skill occupation job share were also mainly concentrated in the low-tech sector but were partially offset by employment share gains in high-skill occupations only in the high-tech industry during this period. Women made large gains in relative real median wages only in high-skill occupations in the high-tech industry while their relative real median wages in other skill occupations and in the low-tech industry stagnated around zero during this period. Men’s gains in relative median wages were also concentrated only in the high-tech industry but were less than half of women’s and were negative (between −10 and −21 percent) in other occupations in the high-tech industry and across all occupations in the low-tech industry. As noted in previous studies, the impact of job polarization is not well understood across sectors and gender. This study finds the high-tech industry in Austin has had unintended consequences in terms of job polarization across gender, providing relatively fewer job opportunities in high-skill occupations to women than men but offering much higher gains in relative real median wages to women than men. Males also found relatively more job opportunities in high-skill occupations in the high-tech industry than women but experienced only half of women’s gains in relative median wages in this industry between 1980 and 2015.

Introduction: This report examines the impact and extent of gentrification in the Washington Heights/Inwood area – traditionally one of Manhattan’s most quintessential Latino neighborhoods. Methods: This report uses the American Community Survey PUMS (Public Use Microdata Series) data for all years released by the Census Bureau and reorganized for public use by the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota, IPUMSusa, (https://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml). Results: The Latino community of Washington Heights/Inwood is not being displaced in any meaningful way. While there has certainly been an increase in the number of wealthy non-Hispanic Whites over the last decade, as of 2015 Latinos maintained the same percentage of the neighborhood’s total population as they did in 1990. The Dominican population, by far the largest Latino subgroup in Washington Heights/Inwood, has actually increased in size over the twenty-five year period and (as of 2015) is still growing. What has changed is an increase in income, employment and educational levels, as well as poverty rates. Discussion: There is evidence to suggest that the popular narrative concerning gentrification in Washington Heights and Inwood is somewhat flawed. This bastion of Latino identity in upper-Manhattan is not becoming less Latino at all. Nevertheless, it is certainly changing, and stakeholders would be wise to familiarize themselves with the specifics surrounding that change if they wish to better understand the obstacles facing New York City Latinos.

Importance: Over the last 15 years, the health care practitioner landscape has changed significantly. Fewer practitioners are self-employed and more are employed by for-profit or nonprofit organizations. These shifts can have an impact on annual labor earnings. Objective: To examine trends in self-employment and employment and to assess the gap in annual labor earnings between self-employed and employed US health care professionals from 2001 to 2015.Design, Setting, and Participants: Survey study in which data on employment type (self-employed, employed by private sector, or employed by government) and annual labor earnings for 50 states and the District of Columbia were extracted from the 2001 to 2015 American Community Survey. The analyses were restricted to 175 714 self-identified dentists, physicians, pharmacists, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and physical therapists aged 30 years and older who worked at least 40 weeks per year and 20 hours per week. Controlling for age, sex, race/ethnicity, year, and state of residence, median regression models were used to measure the gap in annual labor earnings between self-employed and employed health care professionals. Main Outcomes and Measures: Annual labor earnings, defined as the sum of self-employment and wages or salary income. Results: Our sample of 175 714 respondents included 99 077 physicians, 20 008 dentists, 26 143 pharmacists, 4238 optometrists, 6076 chiropractors, 1164 podiatrists, and 19 008 physical therapists. The weighted percentage of self-employed physicians decreased from 35.2% (95% CI, 34.4%-36.1%; 6807 of 18 726 physicians) in 2001 through 2005 to 24.7% (95% CI, 24.2%-25.2%; 10 974 of 41 205 physicians) in 2011 through 2015. The percentage of self-employed dentists decreased from 73.0% (95% CI, 71.2%-74.8%; 3117 of 4153 dentists) in 2001 through 2005 to 65.1% (95% CI, 63.7%-66.4%; 5260 of 7820 dentists) in 2011 through 2015. Among physicians, the regression-adjusted earnings gap reversed from $19 679 (95% CI, $14 431-$24 927;P < .001) during 2001 through 2005 to −$10 623 (95% CI, −$14 547 to −$6699;P < .001) during 2011 through 2015. Among dentists, the regression-adjusted earnings gap narrowed from $30 448 (95% CI, $23 040-$37 855;P < .001) during 2001 through 2005 to $21 291 (95% CI, $15 723-$26 859;P < .001) during 2011 through 2015. From 2001 to 2015 the earnings gap also reversed among pharmacists, optometrists, and podiatrists. The regression-adjusted earnings gap narrowed among chiropractors and physical therapists. Conclusions and Relevance: Since 2001, the percentage of health care professionals who are self-employed declined, and the gap in earnings between self-employed and employed health care professionals narrowed.

The Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provisions have been credited with overall improvements in insurance coverage, access to care, and health. However, recent studies have found that racial and ethnic disparities in coverage have persisted in spite of these improvements. We used data for the period 2010–15 from the American Community Survey about adults ages 19–64 to study the impact of Medicaid expansion on insurance coverage among US natives, naturalized citizens and noncitizen immigrants. We found that uninsurance decreased among US natives, naturalized citizens, and noncitizen immigrants after 2013. The percentage of uninsured noncitizens decreased from 69.6 percent in 2010 to 53.5 percent in 2015. However, uninsurance rates remained high for noncitizens in 2015, with 44.9 percent of them uninsured in expansion states, compared to 16.3 percent of natives. A triple-differences analysis suggested that among natives and noncitizens, 5.6 percent and 5.0 percent, respectively, of the drop in unins...

We analyze for the first time the economic contributions of modern industrial robots, which are flexible, versatile, and autonomous machines. We use novel panel data on robot adoption within industries in seventeen countries from 1993 to 2007 and new instrumental variables that rely on robots’ comparative advantage in specific tasks. Our findings suggest that increased robot use contributed approximately 0.36 percentage points to annual labor productivity growth, while at the same time raising total factor productivity and lowering output prices. Our estimates also suggest that robots did not significantly reduce total employment, although they did reduce low-skilled workers’ employment share.

Technological progress has created prosperity for mankind at large, yet it has always created winners and losers in the labour market. During the days of the British Industrial Revolution a sizeable share of the workforce was left worse off by almost any measure as it lost its jobs to technology. The result was a series of riots against machines. In similar fashion, robots have recently reduced employment and wages in US labour markets. Building on the intuition that voters who have lost out to technology are more likely to opt for radical political change, we examine if robots shaped the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election. Pitching technology against a host of alternative explanations, including offshoring and trade exposure, we document that the support for Donald Trump was significantly higher in local labour markets more exposed to the adoption of robots. A counterfactual analysis based on our estimates shows that Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin would have swung in favour of Hillary Clinton if the exposure to robots had not increased in the immediate years leading up to the election, leaving the Democrats with a majority in the Electoral College.

Coastal communities faced with multiple hazards have shown uneven responses and behaviors. These responses and behaviors could be better understood by analyzing real-time social media data through categorizing them into the three phases of the emergency management: preparedness, response, and recovery. This study analyzes the spatial–temporal patterns of Twitter activities during Hurricane Sandy, which struck the U.S. Northeast on 29 October 2012. The study area includes 126 counties affected by Hurricane Sandy. The objectives are threefold: (1) to derive a set of common indexes from Twitter data so that they can be used for emergency management and resilience analysis; (2) to examine whether there are significant geographical and social disparities in disaster-related Twitter use; and (3) to test whether Twitter data can improve postdisaster damage estimation. Three corresponding hypotheses were tested. Results show that common indexes derived from Twitter data, including ratio, normalized ratio, and sentiment, could enable comparison across regions and events and should be documented. Social and geographical disparities in Twitter use existed in the Hurricane Sandy event, with higher disaster-related Twitter use communities generally being communities of higher socioeconomic status. Finally, adding Twitter indexes into a damage estimation model improved the adjusted R2 from 0.46 to 0.56, indicating that social media data could help improve postdisaster damage estimation, but other environmental and socioeconomic variables influencing the capacity to reducing damage might need to be included. The knowledge gained from this study could provide valuable insights into strategies for utilizing social media data to increase resilience to disasters.

Diaspora networks provide information to future migrants, which affects their success in the host country. While the existing literature explains the effect of networks on the outcomes of migrants through the size of the migrant community, we show that the quality of the network is an equally important determinant. We argue that networks that are more integrated in the society of the host country can provide more accurate information to future migrants about job prospects. In a decision model with imperfect signalling, we show that migrants with access to a better network are more likely to make the right decision, that is, they migrate only if they gain. We test these predictions empirically using data on recent Mexican migrants to the United States. To instrument for the quality of networks, we exploit the settlement of immigrants who came during the Bracero program in the 1950s. The results are consistent with the model predictions, providing evidence that connections to a better integrated network lead to better outcomes after migration.

A multidimensional poverty index for the United States is designed, evaluated, and defended as a useful measurement tool for policymakers to evaluate poverty. Chapter 1 presents a normative case for the index. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on poverty measures. Chapter 3 constructs the proposed index. Chapter 4 is a statistical examination of the internal structure of the index. Chapter 5 explores the index across states, over time, and among population subgroups, as well as presenting policy applications.

Introduction: This report investigates the trends in ancestry rates among the Latino population between 1980 and 2015 in New York City. Methods: This study uses the American Community Survey PUMS (Public Use Microdata Series) of 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015, released by the Census Bureau and reorganized for public use by the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota, IPUMSusa, (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml). In this report, ancestry is defined by the respondent’s self-reported ancestry and Latino group. For example, when someone reported they were Puerto Rican and their ancestry as a single category (“Puerto Rican”), they were classified as Puerto Rican-Only ancestry. When someone reported they were Puerto Rican but with more than one ancestry category (i.e. “Puerto Rican” and “Dominican”), they were classified as Mixed ancestry. Sometimes, people who classified themselves as Puerto Ricans did not report any Puerto Rican ancestry. According to the Census manuals, it could be that they did not answer the self-reported Latino group question but they were assigned one based on the household head’s response. These populations were excluded from the report. Results: Overall, single-origin ancestry rates among the Latino population dropped from 87% in 1980 to 82% in 2015. In turn, mixed ancestry rates rose from 13% to 18% over the same period. This trend was experienced by four of the five Latino nationalities studied in this report, except for Mexicans. Among the latter, mixing rates actually declined from 32% to 8% between 1980 and 2015. Younger Latinos experienced higher mixing rates than older cohorts, as did domestic-born Latinos compared to foreign-born. Finally, Latinos with mixed origin had other Latin Americans as the most prevalent group with which they were mixed. Discussion: The ancestry rates examined in this study show a rise in the mixing ancestry among the Latino population in New York City. Mixing is more frequent among the domestic-born population than among the foreign-born population, which is telling of the chances of finding a partner from a different part of the world while in NYC than in other places. Moreover, mixing is a rising trend among the younger populations, creating a higher diversity within the city in more recent years. However, some trends in endogamy persist, especially among the foreign-born and among the Mexican population. This lower mixing rates among these populations suggest that there might be cultural factors preventing a higher mixing with other groups. Finally, these numbers bare witness to the fact of a growing diversity among the Latino population in New York City, and as such, public policies should include this optic when designing programs for these groups.

There are three chapters in this dissertation. In the first two chapters, I focus on the deceleration of college wage premium growth at national level. In the first chapter, I use a decomposition and counterfactual simulation approach to evaluate three explanations of flattening college wage premium during 2000-2010 and 2000-2015, i.e., demand reversal, polarization and supply change. The simulation results suggest: i. supply change is the most powerful explanation; ii. polarization has expla-natory power but not robust; and iii. demand reversal has little eÿcacy in explaining the fact. By a close look of three explanations, I argue that the “failure” of demand reversal story and the “unstable” impact of polarization story indeed suggest some kinds of weakness of the analytical framework. And there are still some unexplained facts related to the supply change story. A better framework should depend on the endogenous supply of high-skilled workers and heterogenous quality of high-skilled workers. Due to the weakness of the analytical framework in the first chapter, in the second chapter, I use a di˙erent framework to study the deceleration of college wage premium growth. The novel feature of the framework is that the supply of high-skilled workers endogenously depends on the progress of technologies and other shocks. I show the change in progress basis of skill-biased technologies is the primary reason that leads to the deceleration relative to the change in progress speed of skill-biased technologies and the progress of automation. This result suggests the deceleration of college wage premium growth is an inevitable outcome of skill-biased technological change while both demand reversal and polarization have only moderate explanatory power. About the direct mechanism of the deceleration, I find that the faster decline in the mean quality of high-skilled workers followed by a greater o˙set of skill-biased technological change’s positive impact on college wage premium growth due to increase in the progress basis of skill-biased technologies is the primary direct mechanism. Unlike the first two chapters, the third chapter looks into sub-national level labor market inequality change. This chapter studies a spatial pattern and a possible channel of local labor market inequality change. That is, large cities have the greater losses in the declining industries and greater gains in the growing industries. When the declining and growing industries are low-skilled and high-skilled intensive respectively, and the growing industries are skill intensive, the losses and gains of industries lead to a greater increase in the local labor market inequality of those first larger cities. The empirical results show that, one standard deviation change in initial city size accounts for 71.3% to 80.5% of one standard deviation change in industrial composition where the industrial composition change refers the losses in manufacturings (NAICS 31-33, low-skilled worker intensive) and gains in professional services (NAICS 52, 54, and 62, high-skilled worker intensive) here. One standard deviation change in the industrial composition change accounts for 79.5% to 89.8% of one standard deviation change in the local labor market inequality. And overall, the one standard deviation change in initial city size accounts for 62.1% to 65.1% of one standard deviation change in the local labor market via the industrial composition change channel. These empirical results verify the spatial pattern and the channel. And the paper compliments many related discussions in various ways.

As US policy makers tackle immigration reform, knowing whether immigrants are a burden on the nation’s health care system can inform the debate. Previous studies have indicated that immigrants contribute more to Medicare than they receive in benefits but have not examined whether the roughly 50 percent of immigrants with private coverage provide a similar subsidy or even drain health care resources. Using nationally representative data, we found that immigrants accounted for 12.6 percent of premiums paid to private insurers in 2014, but only 9.1 percent of insurer expenditures. Immigrants’ annual premiums exceeded their care expenditures by $1,123 per enrollee (for a total of $24.7 billion), which offsets a deficit of $163 per US-born enrollee. Their net subsidy persisted even after ten years of US residence. In 2008–14, the surplus premiums of immigrants totaled $174.4 billion. These findings suggest that policies curtailing immigration could reduce the numbers of “actuarially desirable” people with priv...

Centennial edition. ""We are undertaking the most tremendous move ever made by LABOR in this country, a move which will lead--NO ONE KNOWS WHERE!" With these words echoing throughout the city, on February 6, 1919, 65,000 Seattle workers began one of the most important general strikes in US history. For six tense yet nonviolent days, the Central Labor Council negotiated with federal and local authorities on behalf of the shipyard workers whose grievances initiated the citywide walkout. Meanwhile, strikers organized to provide essential services such as delivering supplies to hospitals and markets, as well as feeding thousands at union-run dining facilities. Robert L. Friedheim's classic account of the dramatic events of 1919, first published in 1964 and now enhanced with a new introduction, afterword, and photo essay by James N. Gregory, vividly details what happened and why. Overturning conventional understandings of the American Federation of Labor as a conservative labor organization devoted to pure and simple unionism, Friedheim shows the influence of socialists and the IWW in the city's labor movement. While Seattle's strike ended in disappointment, it led to massive strikes across the country that determined the direction of labor, capital, and government for decades. The Seattle General Strike is an exciting portrait of a Seattle long gone and of events that shaped the city's reputation for left-leaning activism into the twenty-first century."--Provided by publisher.