How did the US become a land of opportunity? We show that the country's pioneering role in mass education was key. Unlike previous research, which has focused on father-son income correlations, we incorporate both parents in a new measure of intergenerational mobility that considers multiple inputs, including mothers' and fathers' human capital. To estimate mobility despite limitations in historical data, we introduce a latent variable method and construct a representative linked panel that includes women. Our findings reveal that human capital mobility rose sharply from 1850 to 1950, driven by a declining reliance on maternal human capital, which had been most predictive of child outcomes before widespread schooling. Broadening schooling weakened this reliance on mothers, raising mobility in both human capital and income over time.

How, when, and why did women in the US obtain legal rights equal to men's regarding the workplace, marriage, family, Social Security, criminal justice, credit markets, and other parts of the economy and society, decades after they gained the right to vote? The story begins with the civil rights movement and the somewhat fortuitous nature of the early and key women's rights legislation. The women's right movement then formed to press for further rights. Public opinion to strengthen women's status became more favorable in the 1970s. Of the 134 critical moments in women's rights history from 1905 to 2023, almost 50% occurred between 1963 and 1973. The greatly increased employment of women, the formation of women's rights associations, and the unstinting efforts of various members of Congress (mainly women) were behind the advances. But, women became splintered by marital status, employment, region, and religion far more than men. A substantial group of women emerged in the 1970s to oppose various rights for women, just as they did during the suffrage movement, and they remain a powerful force today.

This paper evaluates large-scale hydroelectric dams built in the United States during the twentieth century. Combining panel event-study designs and synthetic control methods, two results stand out. First, dams constructed pre-1950 spurred short-run local growth, in large part thanks to a ‘cheap-local-power advantage’, and resulted in remarkable long-run growth, more than doubling local population density after 50 years. Second, dams constructed post-1950 had only modest effects on growth. The first result indicates agglomerative impacts on local economic activity. The second result suggests that the cheap-local-power advantage created by hydropower attenuated after 1950, probably because of such innovations as high-tension transmission lines.

The impacts of the pandemic on the employment, labor supply, and caregiving of women are assessed. Compared with previous recessions, the one induced by COVID-19 impacted women’s employment and labor force participation somewhat more relative to men and thus deserves the moniker “she-cession.” But the big divide is less between men and women and more between the more-educated and the lesseducated. Contrary to many accounts, women did not exit the labor force in large numbers, and they did not greatly decrease their hours of work. The aggregate female labor force participation rate did not plummet during the pandemic recession. The ability to balance caregiving and work differed greatly by education, occupation, and race. The more educated could work from home. Those who began the period employed in various in-person “service” occupations and establishments experienced large reductions in employment. Black women were severely impacted beyond other factors considered and the health impact of COVID-19 is a probable reason. The estimation of the pandemic’s impact depends, in part, on the counterfactual used and whether one differences from winter 2020 or from each month in a year prior to 2019. All estimates, however, demonstrate that women in each education group have borne the brunt of increased caregiving even as they managed to hold on to their jobs. The real story of women during the pandemic is that they remained in the labor force and stayed on their jobs, as much as they could.

In Career and Family, Claudia Goldin builds on decades of complex research to examine the gender pay gap and the unequal distribution of labor between couples in the home. Goldin argues that although recent public and private discourse has brought these concerns to light, the actions taken-such as a single company slapped on the wrist or a few progressive leaders going on paternity leave-are the economic equivalent of tossing a band-aid to someone with cancer. These solutions, Goldin writes, treat the symptoms and not the disease of gender inequality in the workplace and economy. Goldin points to data that reveals how the pay gap widens further down the line in women's careers, about 10 to 15 years out, as opposed to those beginning careers after college. She examines five distinct groups of women over the course of the twentieth century: cohorts of women who differ in terms of career, job, marriage, and children, in approximated years of graduation-1900s, 1920s, 1950s, 1970s, and 1990s-based on various demographic, labor force, and occupational outcomes. The book argues that our entire economy is trapped in an old way of doing business; work structures have not adapted as more women enter the workforce. Gender equality in pay and equity in home and childcare labor are flip sides of the same issue, and Goldin frames both in the context of a serious empirical exploration that has not yet been put in a long-run historical context. Career and Family offers a deep look into census data, rich information about individual college graduates over their lifetimes, and various records and new sources of material to offer a new model to restructure the home and school systems that contribute to the gender pay gap and the quest for both family and career.

The race between education and technology provides a canonical framework that does an excellent job of explaining US wage structure changes across the twentieth century. The framework involves secular increases in the demand for more-educated workers from skill-biased technological change, combined with variations in the supply of skills from changes in educational access. We expand the analysis backwards and forwards. The framework helps explain rising skill differentials in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, but needs to be augmented to illuminate the recent convexification of education returns and implied slowdown in the growth of the relative demand for college workers. Increased educational wage differentials explain 75 percent of the rise of U.S. wage inequality from 1980 to 2000 as compared to 38 percent for 2000 to 2017.

The race between education and technology provides a canonical framework that does an excellent job of explaining U.S. wage structure changes across the twentieth century. The framework involves secular increases in the demand for more-educated workers from skill-biased technological change, combined with variations in the supply of skills from changes in educational access. We expand the analysis backwards and forwards. The framework helps explain rising skill differentials in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, but needs to be augmented to illuminate the recent convexification of education returns and implied slowdown in the growth of the relative demand for college workers. Increased educational wage differentials explain 75 percent of the rise of U.S. wage inequality from 1980 to 2000 as compared to 38 percent for 2000 to 2017.

Females live a lot longer than males in most parts of the world today. But that was not always the case. We ask when and why the female advantage emerged. We show that reductions in maternal mortality and fertility are only partial reasons. Rather, the sharp reduction in infectious disease in the early twentieth century played a role. Those who survive most infectious diseases carry a health burden that affects organs and impacts general well-being. We use newly collected data from Massachusetts containing information on cause of death since 1887 to show that females between the ages of 5 and 25 were disproportionately affected by infectious diseases. Both males and females lived longer as the burden of infectious disease fell, but women were more greatly impacted. Our explanation does not tell us precisely why women live longer than men, but it does help understand the timing of their relative increase.

Economic inequality since 1980 increased greatly. The earnings of college graduates rose at a far greater clip than did the earnings of those who stopped at high school graduation. The incomes of top managers and professionals increased at a much faster rate than did those of ordinary workers. The increase in inequality was more all-encompassing than a widening between different education levels or occupational groups. The expanding gap also occurred within groups, even within educational levels. Among college graduates, for example, those with degrees from institutions with higher standards for admissions earned relatively more over time. Those who went to more prestigious law schools did better relative to other law school graduates. The widening occurred within virtually all groups in a manner that is not easily explained by the usual observable factors such as years of schooling. At almost all educational and experience levels, for example, the earnings for those near the top of the distribution increased considerably relative to those near the middle or close to the bottom.1 The pervasive and rapid increase in economic inequality has led many to search for explanatory factors that are themselves pervasive and rapid. A key suspect is skill-biased technological change, particularly that involved in the use of computers.2 Chief among other factors that have been mentioned are increased international trade and outsourcing, the greater immigration of low-wage workers, the decline in private­sector unionization, the erosion of the real value of the federal minimum wage, and changes in social norms concerning the pay of executives and other top-end earners. Here we mainly discuss the role of technological change.

Females live longer than males in most parts of the world today. Among OECD nations in recent years, the difference in life expectancy at birth is around four to six years (seven in Japan). But have women always lived so much longer than men? The answer is that they have not. We ask when and why the female advantage emerged. We show that reductions in maternal mortality and fertility are not the reasons. Rather, we argue that the sharp reduction in infectious disease in the early twentieth century played a role. The primary reason is that those who survive most infectious diseases carry a health burden that affects organs, such as the heart, as well as impacting general well-being. We use new data from Massachusetts containing information on causes of death from 1887 to show that infectious diseases disproportionately affected females between the ages of 5 and 25. Increased longevity of women, therefore, occurred as the burden of infectious disease fell for all. Our explanation does not tell us why women live longer than men, but it does help understand the timing of the increase.

We explore the first period of decline in infant mortality in the U.S. and provide estimates of the independent and combined effects of clean water and effective sewerage systems on infant mortality. Our case is Massachusetts, 1880-1915, when state authorities developed a sewerage and water district for municipalities in the Boston Greater Metropolitan area. We find that the two interventions were complementary and together accounted for approximately 37 percent of the total decline in log infant mortality among treated municipalities during the 36 years considered. Considerable research has documented the importance of clean water interventions for improvement in population health, but there is less evidence on the importance of sewerage systems. Our findings are directly relevant to urbanization in the developing world and suggest that a dual-pronged approach of safe water and sewerage is important to improving infant and early child survival.

We explore the first period of decline in infant mortality in the U.S. and provide estimates of the independent and combined effects of clean water and effective sewerage systems on infant mortality. Our case is Massachusetts, 1880-1915, when state authorities developed a sewerage and water district for municipalities in the Boston Greater Metropolitan area. We find that the two interventions were complementary and together accounted for approximately 37 percent of the total decline in log infant mortality among treated municipalities during the 36 years considered. Considerable research has documented the importance of clean water interventions for improvement in population health, but there is less evidence on the importance of sewerage systems. Our findings are directly relevant to urbanization in the developing world and suggest that a dual-pronged approach of safe water and sewerage is important to improving infant and early child survival.

The converging roles of men and women are among the grandest advances in society and the economy in the last century. These aspects of the grand gender convergence are figurative chapters in a history of gender roles. But what must the "last" chapter contain for there to be equality in the labor market? The answer may come as a surprise. The solution does not (necessarily) have to involve government intervention and it need not make men more responsible in the home (although that wouldn't hurt). But it must involve changes in the labor market, especially how jobs are structured and remunerated to enhance temporal flexibility. The gender gap in pay would be considerably reduced and might vanish altogether if firms did not have an incentive to disproportionately reward individuals who labored long hours and worked particular hours. Such change has taken off in various sectors, such as technology, science, and health, but is less apparent in the corporate, financial, and legal worlds.

The most prominent feature of the female labor force across the past hundred years is its enormous growth. But many believe that the increase was discontinuous. Our purpose is to identify the short- and long-run impacts of WWII on the labor supply of women who were currently married in 1950 and 1960. We use mobilization rates for various groups of men (by age, race, fatherhood) to see whether there was a wartime impact. We find that an aggregate mobilization rate produces the largest and most robust impacts on both weeks worked and the labor force participation of married white (non-farm) women. The impact, moreover, was experienced primarily by women in the top half of the education distribution. Women who were married but without children during WWII were the group most impacted by the mobilization rate in 1950, although by 1960 WWII still influenced the labor supply decisions of them as well as those with children during WWII. We end the paper with a resolution between the watershed and revisionist views of the role of WWII on female labor supply.

The most prominent feature of the female labor force across the past hundred years is its enormous growth. But many believe that the increase was discontinuous. Our purpose is to identify the short- and long-run impacts of WWII on the labor supply of women who were currently married in 1950 and 1960. Using WWII mobilization rates by state, we find a wartime impact on weeks worked and the labor force participation of married white (non-farm) women in both 1950 and 1960. The impact, moreover, was experienced almost entirely by women in the top half of the education distribution.

The most prominent feature of the female labor force across the past hundred years is its enormous growth. But many believe that the increase was discontinuous. Our purpose is to identify the short- and long-run impacts of WWII on the labor supply of women who were currently married in 1950 and 1960. We use mobilization rates for various groups of men (by age, race, fatherhood) to see whether there was a wartime impact. We find that an aggregate mobilization rate produces the largest and most robust impacts on both weeks worked and the labor force participation of married white (non-farm) women. The impact, moreover, was experienced primarily by women in the top half of the education distribution. Women who were married but without children during WWII were the group most impacted by the mobilization rate in 1950, although by 1960 WWII still influenced the labor supply decisions of them as well as those with children during WWII. We end the paper with a resolution between the watershed and revisionist views of the role of WWII on female labor supply.

Pharmacy has become a female-majority profession that is highly remunerated with a small gender earnings gap and low earnings dispersion relative to other occupations. We sketch a labor market framework based on the theory of equalizing differences to integrate and interpret our empirical findings on earnings, hours of work, and the part-time work wage penalty for pharmacists. Using extensive surveys of pharmacists for 2000, 2004, and 2009 as well as samples from the American Community Surveys and the Current Population Surveys, we explore the gender earnings gap, the penalty to part-time work, labor force persistence, and the demographics of pharmacists relative to other college graduates. We address why the substantial entrance of women into the profession was associated with an increase in their earnings relative to male pharmacists. We conclude that the changing nature of pharmacy employment with the growth of large national pharmacy chains and hospitals and the related decline of independent pharmacies played key roles in the creation of a more family-friendly, female-friendly pharmacy profession. The position of pharmacist is probably the most egalitarian of all U.S. professions today.

The authors study the pecuniary penalties for family-relatedamenities in the workplace (e.g., job interruptions, short hours, part-time work, and flexibility during the workday), how women have responded to them, and how the penalties have changed over time. The pecuniary penalties to behaviors that are beneficial to family appear to have decreased in many professions. Self-employment has declined in many of the high-end professions (e.g., pharmacy, optometry, dentistry, law, medicine, and veterinary medicine) where it was costly in terms of workplace flexibility. The authors conclude that many professions have experienced an increase in workplace flexibility, driven often by exogenous factors(e.g., increased scale of operations and shifts to corporate ownership of business) but also endogenously because of an increased number of women. Workplace flexibility in some positions, notably in the business and financial sectors, has lagged.

From 1910 to 1940, a period known in U.S. educational history as the high school movement, the fraction of youths enrolled in public and private U.S. secondary schools increased from 18 to 71 percent. The fraction graduating nationwide soared from 9 to 51 percent (see fi gure 9.1) and the increase was even greater in most northern and western states (see fi gure 9.2 for U.S. regional data). Such increases are as large as those achieved in the recent histories of nations undergoing the most rapid of transitions to mass secondary schooling. In South Korea, for example, the fraction graduating from upper secondary school increased from 25 percent to 88 percent in the three decades from 1954 to 1984.