Women now attain bachelors and graduate degrees at rates that equal or exceed rates for men. Despite this progress, sex segregation in fields of study persists. Men are morelikely than women to major in science, particularly physical science and engineering, and data indicate that gender convergence among science majors is not likely in the near future. Women's choices to enter into science or not, and to enter into physical science or engineering versus other elite professions may be due to their assessment of different levels of compatibility with family goals for various prestigious careers. Using data fromthe 1980 to 2000 Census and the 2009 American Community Survey, we analyze trends over time in highly-educated women's occupational choices and the consequences of theirchoices in terms of marriage, fertility and earnings. We find that the women in science professions earn less than women in other elite professions, like medicine, law andbusiness, but do not experience drastically different family arrangements or wage penalties for having children compared to other elite professions.

Record shares of young adults are completing high school, going to college and finishing college, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of newly available census data. In 2012, for the first time ever, one-third of the nations 25- to 29-year-olds have completed at least a bachelors degree.These across-the-board increases have occurred despite dramatic immigration-driven changes in the racial and ethnic composition of college-age young adults, a trend that had led some experts to expect a decline in educational attainment.College completion is now at record levels among key demographic groups: men and women; blacks, whites and Hispanics; and foreign-born and native-born Americans.Also, a record share of the nations young adults ages 25 to 29 (90%) has finished at least a high school education. And another record share63%has completed at least some college.

American marriage has changed in important ways over the latter half of the twentieth century and in the first decades of the twenty first century. Marriage is increasingly delayed and even forgone with those changes particularly pronounced for African Americans and those with relatively less education. These changes are intertwined with increases in non-marital cohabitation and fertility. In concert, these demographic shifts have important implications for inequality as those who are already disadvantaged increasingly marry later and less, leading to less exposure to the benefits that marriage appears to confer on both children and adults. Scholars of the family have long focused on how education, employment, and earnings affect individuals likelihoods of marriage. However, recent qualitative and ethnographic research suggests that to adequately understand current patterns of marriage entry, scholars must look beyond these characteristics to consider the role of wealth in union formation. This dissertation takes a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to examining the link between wealth and the transition to marriage. In the first empirical chapter, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 to model the relationship between the ownership of key personal assets and transition to first marriage. I find that ownership of a car and financial assets for men and a car and other assets for women is positively related to entry into first marriages and that accounting for gaps in wealth ownership by race and education explains a portion of the marital divides along those same axes of differentiation. The second empirical chapter draws on data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study to model the relationship between wealth and marriage in the contemporary period for a sample of disadvantaged parents who were unmarried at the birth of their children. I find additional evidence of a link between asset ownership and marriage entry. However, I find little evidence that asset ownership is related to entry into cohabitation or that access to other economic resources can take the place of assets for marriage. In the final empirical chapter, I use a novel data source to assess how wealth losses during the Great Recession may have impacted plans to marry and find evidence that men and women who have lost wealth are more likely to plan to delay marriage.

Between 1992 and 2009, 29 US states adopted laws mandating that health insurance plans cover screenings for prostate cancer. Because prostate cancer screenings are used almost exclusively by men over 50, these mandates raise the cost of insuring older men relative to other groups. This paper uses a triple-difference empirical strategy to take advantage of this quasi-random natural experiment in raising the cost of employing older workers. Using IPUMS data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, this paper finds that the increased cost of insuring older workers results in them receiving 3% lower hourly wages, being 2.2% less likely to be employed, and being 2% less likely to have employer-sponsored health insurance.

Gender gaps in the workplace are widespread. One explanation for gender inequality stems from the e§ects of the interaction between competition and two pressure sources, namely, task stereotypes and time constraints. This study uses a laboratory experiment to Önd that the gender gap in performance under competition and preferences for competition can be partly explained by the di§erential responses of men and women to the above pressures. In particular, while women underperform the men in a high- pressure math-based tournament, women greatly increase their performance levels and their willingness to compete in a low-pressure verbal environment, such that they actually surpass the men. This e§ect appears largely due to the fact that extra time in a verbal competition improves the quality of womenís work, reducing their mistake share. On the other hand, men use this extra time to increase only the quantity of work, which results in a greater relative number of mistakes. A simple labor market study suggests that the nature of the job and the stress level seem to be correlated with the gender gap in the labor market in a manner consistent with the results of my experiment.

This paper explores how a rise in a gender’s scarcity may impact educational investments using exogenous variation in the marriage market of second generation Americans in early 20th century. Theoretically, one may expect this to occur through two potential channels: a change in matching possibilities or in post-match bargaining. Empirically, I find that worse marriage market conditions spurs higher pre-marital investments: the effect for males is significant (0.2 years of education for one standard deviation in the sex ratio) while for females, it is only observed in highly endogamous groups. When faced with an exogenously larger number of males per females, males’ marriages appear to be less stable and more likely to involve natives and more educated spouses while women are less likely to work and, for those in high endogamous groups, marry more immigrants.

We use family fixed-effects models to estimate the impact of childhood health on adult literacy, labor force outcomes, and marital status among pairs of white brothers observed as children in the 1880 U.S. Census and then as adults in the 1900e1930 Censuses. Given our focus on the 19th century, we observed a wider array of infectious, chronic, and traumatic health problems than is observed using data that are more recent; our results thus provide some insights into circumstances in modern developing countries where similar health problems are more frequently observed. Compared to their healthy siblings, sick brothers were less likely to be located (and thus more likely to be dead) 20e50 years after their 1880 enumeration. Sick brothers were also less likely to be literate, to have ever been married, and to have reported an occupation. However, among those with occupations, sick and healthy brothers tended to do similar kinds of work. We discuss the implications of our results for research on the impact ofchildhood health on socioeconomic outcomes in developed and developing countries.

June 2009 marked the third anniversary of the official end of the Great Recession. It is important to emphasize end because three years of economic recovery have minimal impact on the job fortunes of most people in this country. The June 2012 unemployment rate of 8.2% was only a bit lower than the 9.5% unemployment rate that existed in June 2009 and far from the nations 5.0% unemployment rate at the start of the recession in December 2007. For the Black community, this dismal performance is worse. In June 2012, the unemployment rate was 14.4%; barely lower than the June 2009 rate of 14.9%. When the recession began, the Black unemployment was 9.0%.The fact that the unemployment rate for the Black community at the start of the recession was higher than the current rate for all workers three years into a sluggish recovery provides a snapshot of how race still matters in the United States. Given the continued saliency of race, it important to understand how racial difference manifests in various institutions in this country. This report provides a picture of how Black workers fare in the labor market in the Chicago metropolitan region with respect to labor force status and income.

At the December 13, 2011 meeting of the Maine Jobs Council / State Workforce Investment Board, Governor Paul R. LePage articulated his vision for workforce development in Maine. He emphasized three key points; a revitalized State Workforce Investment Board (SWIB) with a new roster of members; a restructured workforce development system that is more responsive to business workforce needs; and Industry Partnerships as a cornerstone of Maine’s workforce development strategy. The Governor charged his new board with creating and implementing policies that quickly train the most people for meaningful careers giving industries the skilled workforce needed to support Maine’s economic recovery. Governor LePage asked the SWIB to work with the Maine Department of Labor to review alternative structural models for the system and make recommendations as to the best option for Maine. “This is an opportunity to revitalize the State Workforce Investment Board and its mission” said Governor LePage. “More dollars must find their way directly to Maine people so they can get the training they need to earn a living and build new skills that prepares them not only for a job but future careers. We need to be better stewards of that money – spending less on administration, and more on training that will put Maine people back to work,” said Governor LePage. Speaking before the Maine State Workforce Investment Board, the Governor pointed to industry partnerships as the cornerstone of his workforce development strategy. The industry partnership model engages businesses in identifying skill gaps in the workforce, prioritizing training initiatives and developing defined career ladders where workers can build on prior skills and new learning to advance in their jobs. “When we strategically invest in our workforce, everyone wins,” said LePage. “Businesses have the skilled employees they need to innovate and be competitive in a global economy, and workers have better opportunity for not just jobs – but careers that lead to good wages and long term stability.”

As of 2010, an estimated 23.7 percent of all Texans (5.9 million people) had no health insurance coverage, a larger percentage of population uninsured than any other state. The Affordable Care Act (ACA), the most comprehensive health care program passed by the Congress of the United States since 1965, is designed to expand health insurance coverage so that more people have access to health care. Despite its comprehensive nature there are likely to be persons who will not be covered by insurance even after full implementation of the ACA, either because they are exempt from specific provisions of the Act or because, for various reasons, they choose not to obtain health insurance. The differences in how many enroll in some form of health insurance will depend upon the efforts of the State of Texas and health care advocates to enroll people in public health insurance (Medicaid and CHIP) and how well the health benefits exchange is developed and marketed. Given the population in Texas in 2010, and had all of the provisions of the Act been implemented in 2010 and assuming a moderate scenario that increases enrollment in public and private health insurance, we estimate the following changes:  A 3.0 million decline in the uninsured from 5.9 million to an estimated 2.9 million;  88% of Texans (and 87% of non-elderly Texans) would be enrolled in some form of health insurance (up from 77% and 74%, respectively);  165 counties would have larger percentage increases in the number of insured than the State as a whole (at a 15.3% increase);  34 counties would have larger proportions of the population remaining uninsured than the State as whole (at 11.6%) including: o The largest urban counties, including: Cameron (13.7%), Dallas (14.1%), El Paso (12.9%), Harris (13.9%), Hidalgo (15.0%), Tarrant (12.0%), and Webb (14.2%); o Many rural counties throughout Texas; o Counties in the South and West Texas border area. The percent and number uninsured decreases for all counties. Areas in Texas that will benefit most from the ACA are those counties where health insurance rates are already low. These counties are located primarily in rural areas of the state and in particular, areas in South and West Texas, and central city counties. After full implantation of the ACA, we estimate the following changes by county type:  Average percent uninsured will decrease from 22.7% to 10.0% for rural counties, increasing the number of insured rural Texans by 395,000 people (16.8% increase)  Average percent uninsured will decrease from 23.7% to 11.0% for central city counties, increasing the number of insured urban Texans by 2.0 million (15.8% increase);  Average percent uninsured will decrease from 21.1% to 9.5% for suburban counties, increasing the number of insured suburban Texans by 587,000 (13.3% increase) These geographic differences in impacts are a result of differences in the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of county populations and how the provisions of the Act will differentially impact specific demographic groups. Counties most impacted by the provisions of ii the Act will be those with larger proportions of their population in households with low to moderate income because these are the households who benefit most from two major provisions of the Act: (1) an expansion of Medicaid coverage to persons in households with incomes less than or equal to 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) and, (2) the development of a Healthcare Insurance Exchange with subsidized coverage for those persons in households with incomes less than or equal to 400 percent of FPL. Those counties with higher relative proportions of their population uninsured following full implementation of the ACA are those counties with larger numbers of immigrants, fewer governmental employees, and larger proportions of the population with low to moderate incomes. This report provides an overview of the estimated impacts of the ACA as passed and fully implemented and the methods used to estimate these impacts.

That the employment rate appears to respond to changes in trend growth is an enduring macroeconomic puzzle. This paper shows that, in the presence of a return to experience, a slowdown in produc- tivity growth raises reservation wages, thereby lowering aggregate employment. The paper develops new evidence that shows this mech- anism is important for explaining the growth-employment puzzle. The combined effects of changes in aggregate wage growth and returns to experience account for all the increase from 1968 to 2006 in non- employment among low-skilled men and for approximately half the increase in nonemployment among all men.

For over two decades, numerous scholars have studied the relationship between the 'new economy' and various labor market outcomes. However, the new economy lacks a coherent definition as a structural process in the study of social stratification. Variation in structural changes between local labor markets over time also remains under-scrutinzed. This paper examines the relatioship between the transition to the new economy and racial and ethnic wage gaps, which persist despite rising human capital among minority workers. The study uses the 5% micro-data samples from the 1980-2000 decennial censuses, and the 2010 American Community Survey. Cross-sectional and fixed-effects regression analyses estimate the relationships between hourly wages of white, black, Latino, and Asian workers, and changes in five structural factors associated with the new economy: skill-biased technological change, financialization, casualized employment, service sector growth, and immigration. Results indicate mixed patterns of relationships between each structural factor and wage inequalities. The transition to the new economy overall increases the white-black wage gap by up to 35% and the white-Latino wage gap by up to 52% from 1980 to 2010. There is relatively little change in the white-Asian gap. Despite the appearance of being race neutral, structural changes associated with the new economy reinforce pre-existing patterns racial/ethnic stratification.

Using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a panel of Mexican individuals interviewed in 2002 and 2005, we analyse the characteristics of migrants from Mexico to the US relative to non-migrants and those who migrated and subsequently returned to Mexico. Using pre- and post-migration earnings and their earnings in the US from the American Community Survey (ACS), we characterise the selection of migrants on observable and non-observable characteristics. Merging the data with US ACS data, we can also measure the expected earnings premium of migration to the US and the earnings premium for those that returned to Mexico. We find that migrants respond to the expected earnings premium to migration, once we control for migration costs. Also, the structure of the premium across skill groups generates negative selection on average and it can explain selection on observable and unobservables. We also find that returnees are more positively selected over skills than migrants to the US. Initial poverty, old age and family ties are strong deterrents of migration to the US, once we account for the skill-specific migration premium. We also find a strong under-representation of college educated among migrants to the US, possibly a consequence of the fact that undocumented migration is not an attractive option for those individuals.

We leverage the introduction of antibiotics in 1937 to demonstrate the long-run impactsof pneumonia in infancy on human capital and socioeconomic status among American adults. Theseimpacts are larger for whites, despite the fact that blacks experienced larger post-1937 declines inpneumonia mortality rates. We argue that pre-Civil Rights barriers to human capital accumulationinhibited complementary investments by blacks. Consistent with this, we see significant gradientsin impacts for blacks (but not whites) by indicators of institutional segregation. Our resultsdemonstrate the importance of responsive investments in translating early-life health into later lifesocioeconomic status and highlight persistent impacts of racial segregation.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the largest amnesty in U.S. history, took effect in 1986 and legalized all immigrants who arrived before 1982. The IRCA creates a discontinuity, according to the year of entry, in the probability of having legal status. Therefore, I use the regression discontinuity approach to study the impact of legality on immigrants’ labor market outcomes and human capital. Using Californian Latino immigrants from Census 1990, I find that the 1975–81 arrivals, on average, outperform the 1982–86 arrivals in male wages, female employment probability, and male English-speaking ability. These findings are not due to a general trend in U.S. labor market conditions because the same analysis, using refugees, Puerto Rican migrants and U.S.-born Latinos—three comparison groups without legality issues—indicates no difference in outcomes between the 1975–81 and 1982–86 cohorts. However, the advantage of Latino immigrants of the earlier cohort over the later cohort diminishes in Census 2000.

At present, few states cover non-disabled, non-pregnant parents with incomes up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and even fewer cover such adults without dependent children. With the implementation of the coverage provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Medicaid eligibility could increase dramatically for these groups. This analysis suggests that the approximately 15.1 million uninsured adults who could gain coverage under the ACA Medicaid expansion are a diverse group in terms of their age and race/ethnicity. Though over half of this group is under age 35, 35 percent are between the ages of 35 and 54 and over 10 percent are near elderly adults between the ages of 55 and 64. Nationwide, just over half are white, but their racial and ethnic composition varies substantially across states. And while over four in five of these uninsured are adults who are not living with dependent children, 2.7 million are parents living with dependent children. Just over half (53 percent) of the uninsured who could gain coverage under the Medicaid expansion are male, but 4.6 million are women of reproductive age. States are now weighing whether to expand Medicaid under the ACAsome states have expressed concern that expanding Medicaid to more adults may pose fiscal challenges. However, purely monetary calculations ignore the potential human, financial, and productivity benefits associated with improved access to affordable health care for the millions of low-income adults without health insurance coverage and their families.