Since the 1940's, the provider role has changed dramatically, both in terms of provider role conduct, or the actual behavior of men, and provider role culture, or the beliefs and attitudes men hold about being a provider. Although the majority of men are not providers today, many support the idea that a man should be a provider in his family. The extant literature demonstrates that the good provider role is often central to a man's sense of self and definition of masculinity, even if he himself does not fulfill that role. Although men's family and career choices are diverging, images of the good provider persist. The literature also suggests that provider role conduct is changing rapidly, but that provider role culture has not kept pace. This asynchronous change can be largely explained by the link between the provider role and masculinity, which is reinforced at both the familial and societal level. Census data was utilized to track provider role behavior from the 1940 through the 1990 census. Cross-tabulations were used to do a life course, cohort analysis of men. Four main groups of men were tracked: providers, shared providers, autonomous men and non-providers. These were termed men's work and family orientations. There are far fewer providers today than sixty years ago, with older cohorts being much more likely to be providers than younger cohorts are. On the other hand, there are far more shared providers today, with younger cohorts being much more likely to be shared providers. There are also far more autonomous men today, as well as an increase in older non-providers today who apparently retire early. For men under 50, there is a very low percentage of non-working men. This shows how strong the norm ofemployment is for married women. As hypothesized, provider role culture has also changed, but not as rapidly as provider role conduct. Provider role culture was measure by utilizing data from the General Social Survey. These data were used to track men's attitudes to four responses measuringvarious gender-related topics. Cross-tabulations were used to compare men's responses to these measures by their work and family orientation and to track these over time. Overall, men have become more egalitarian over time. Men were more likely to agree with women's equality at the macro-level, such as voting for a woman president and believing that women should participate equally in running the country. There were not significant differences between work and family orientations within these macro-level constructs. However, all men, and especially providers and non-providers, were less likely to be egalitarian in situations where women's equality affects them directly, such as the division of labor within their homes or if women's workplace equality affects their own real or perceived job security. In such micro-level measures of gender attitudes, the differences between work and family orientations were much more significant.

The Bay Area faces an ever worsening disconnect between the locations of jobs, and housing that is compatible in price to the wages that those jobs pay. Unless more attention is given to this problem, commute times will continue to increase, pollution will increase, employee productivity will be lost, and the overall quality of life in the Bay Area will decline. This is what we are calling the problem of the jobs-housing match. Cities and employers must be impressed as to the importance of this problem, and encouraged to discuss possible ways to alleviate the situation.This pilot study examines the City of Dublin, one of the fastest growing cities in the Bay Area. Dublin expectsto see thousands of jobs move to the area in the next several years. However, very little thought has been givento the types of housing that will be demanded by all these new employees. In fact, many of these employers expect that the vast majority of their new employees will commute from areas where housing is less expensive.State law recognizes the regional nature of the housing market, and requires every city and county to plan for itsfair share of the regions housing needs (655883(a)(1)). As ABAG notes in its Blueprint for Bay Area Housing, only by identifying and measuring local housing needs can a community design its housing programs appropriately. Communities must take into consideration: Future population and employment growth; Affordability; Existing shortages; Replacement of housing which has been, or might be, eliminated; Deterioration; and Homes for those with special housing needsIn this study we examine only future population and employment growth, and affordability. The mathematicalmodel in this study utilized employee salary data, gathered from three employers that will hire over 4,300 employees for their Dublin offices within the next year. We categorized these salaries into different incomebrackets and then sorted incomes into households according to factors observed in Census data. These household incomes were then classified according to the type of housing that they will need. This housing match was done solely based on the amount of house that could be afforded by a household with this salary.Our findings demonstrate that over 85% of the incomes for these newly created jobs will be above $60,000, andalmost 50% of the jobs created will pay over $100,000 annually. This means that the majority of theseemployees will require larger-than-average houses, and Dublin must alter its housing plans to accommodatethese new employees. However, in this model no job multiplier has been considered, so these results are not anaccurate estimate of housing demand. Matching jobs to housing will very likely require Dublin to plan for morelow-income housing than this model would indicate.

This paper argues that individuals are more likely to have social capital the greater the incidence of people in their neighborhood who share certain traits which affect the ease and nature of social interaction. We argue that race and language are examples of such relational traits. The paper tests this prediction using an indicator of social capital never previously studied: whether someone uses a carpool to get to work. This measure retains nearly all of the strengths of previously used measures, and is free of most of their weaknesses. Analysis is conducted on a merged data set, with individual level data drawn from the 1990 IPUMS Census extract, and information on neighborhoods (PUMAs) derived from the 1990 Census STF3 tables. The models predictions are confirmed for both race and language.

This paper examines race, gender and educational class effects on occupational prestige. A weighted 1 percent randomly selected sample of all high school graduates and higher of Census Bureau Integrated Public Use Microdata (N=138,000,000) indicates black males are at a significant disadvantage. These prestige disadvantages result in race, gender and educational class conflicts.

This paper examines occupational mobility among African-American workers in Cincinnati. Ohio. in the late 1910s. New longitudinal evidence on this issue is developed using census manuscripts. census public use samples, and World War I Selective Service registration records. While African Americans as a whole experienced less upward occupational mobility than did whites in Cincinnati. Southern-born blacks moved up about as frequently as Northern-born blacks did. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

This paper examines occupational mobility among African-American workers in Cincinnati. Ohio. in the late 1910s. New longitudinal evidence on this issue is developed using census manuscripts. census public use samples, and World War I Selective Service registration records. While African Americans as a whole experienced less upward occupational mobility than did whites in Cincinnati. Southern-born blacks moved up about as frequently as Northern-born blacks did. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

Immigration is remaking the United States. But travel to New York or Los Angeles or Miami or San Francisco or Chicago and the multi-ethnic society of tomorrow is already in place. In these capitals of immigrant America, we seem to have returned to the turn of the last century, yet doing so with a distinctive twist: today's urban reality appears unlikely to provide today's newcomers with the same opportunities that their predecessors encountered. Using the latest sources of information, and focusing on the same set of places, this carefully edited volume of original essays looks at the nexus between urban fates and immigrant destinies. Strangers at the Gates sheds new light on the prospects for immigrants' progress and the conditions that will hinder or aid the newest Americans, in their quest to get ahead.

At regular intervals it has become customary for closure of long and persistent historical processes to be invoked in both scholarly and popular outlets. Typically the author manages to give voice to a sentiment widely sensed and shared that has yet to be put into the language of the moment. Examples include professions by Daniel Bell of "the end of ideology," by Dinesh D'Souza of "the end of racism," and by Francis Fukuyama of "the end of history." The Bell (1962) and Fukuyama (1992) claims actually are similar, both contending - wrongly - that the intellectual and political struggle between "capitalism" and "communism" as competing social systems is at an end. Bell argued that convergence around the "mixed economy" was in transcendence. Fukuyama, in contrast, now argues that the free-market economy stands triumphant in the international arena. D'Souza's (1995) "end of racism" proclaimation conjures up the sleight of hand of a double entendre. One meaning utilizes the secondary definition of the term "end" as goal or objective. In a book where he resuscitates the worst imperial and racial biases of 19* century social science, D'Souza not . . .

This thesis explores the reasons behind child labor in Italian immigrant families. It uses the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for the 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses to examine ethnic, gender, age, and generational differences among child workers in the United States. The data indicate that the rate of child labor in the Italian group generally resembled child labor rates in other groups: employment rates were higher for boys, for older children, and for first-generation children. The data also show that child labor declined sharply during the early decades of the twentieth century and across successive generations of Italian-Americans. Both primary and secondary sources illustrate that Italians came to the United States with a utilitarian view of children, seeing them as a component in a family economy oriented first toward survival and then toward accumulation. Interviews of Italian child workers suggest that many preferred the rewards of work to the rigors of the classroom. Oral histories taken later in life indicate that, in hindsight, those who had worked as children felt proud that they had contributed to their families' well-being, but many also looked back with regret over missed opportunities.

Marital assimilation has been a historically important aspect of immigrant adaptation and acculturation. Does the dual status of being a racial minority and an immigrant increase barriers to marital assimilation? And how does marital assimilation differ between natives and immigrants across racial minorities-African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans? Using data from the 1990 Census, we apply log-linear models to answer these questions by comparing marriage patterns by racial and nativity combinations of couples. Our results indicate that Latinos are most likely to marry Whites, followed by Asian Americans and African Americans. The overwhelming shares of immigrants tend to marry same-race immigrants rather than same-race natives of other racial minorities. At the same time, racial minority immigrants are substantially more likely to marry their native same-race counterparts than to marry Whites. Clearly, intermarriage between natives and immigrants is a significant but often neglected aspect of contemporary patterns of assimilation.

The majority of U.S. temporary help supply (THS) firms offer nominally free, unrestricted computer skills training, a practice inconsistent with the competitive model of training. I propose and test a model in which firms offer general training to induce self-selection and perform screening of worker ability. The model implies, and the data confirm, that firms providing training attract higher ability workers yet pay them lower wages after training. Thus, beyond providing spot market labor, THS firms sell information about worker quality to their clients. The rapid growth of THS employment suggests that demand for worker screening is rising.

We estimate the effect of high school graduation on participation in criminal activity accounting for endogeneity of schooling. Crime is a negative externality with enormous social costs, so if education reduces crime, then schooling may have large social benefits that are not taken into account by individuals.We begin by analyzing the effect of high school graduation on incarceration using Census data. Instrumental variable estimates using changes in state compulsory attendance laws as an instrument for high school graduation uncover a significant reduction in incarceration for both blacks and whites. The interpretation of the IV estimator is complicated by the fact that our instrument affects schooling progressions at many different grade levels. When estimating the impact of high school graduation only, OLS and IV estimators estimate different weighted sums of the impact of each schooling progression on the probability of incarceration. We clarify the relationship between OLS and IV estimates and show that the ``weights' placed on the impact of each schooling progression are functions of observable quantities. Differences in these ``weights' explain much of the difference between our OLS and IV estimates. Overall, the estimates suggest that completing high school reduces the probability of incarceration by about .76 percentage points for whites and 3.4 percentage points for blacks.We corroborate our findings on incarceration usingFBI data on arrests that distinguish among different types of crimes. The biggest impacts of graduation are associated with murder, assault, and motor vehicle theft. We also examine the effect of drop out on self-reported crime in the NLSY and find that our estimates for imprisonment and arrest are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not educational differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime.Given the consistency of our estimates, we calculate the social savings from crime reduction associated with high school graduation. The externality of education is about 14-26% of the private return to schooling, suggesting that a significant part of the social return to education comes in the form of externalities from crime reduction.

From 1950 to 1999, married women's labor force participation rate increased from 23% to 72% among those younger than 55. Currently, married women of middle-income husbands are more likely to be in the labor force than those of high- or low-income husbands, but this pattern emerged only after 1980. Using Census date from 1950 to 1990 and 1999 CPS data , the proposed paper analyzed the pattern for various racial/ethnic groups (African, Asian, and Hispanic Americans). It was found that married women's labor force participation rate hasn't converged much among racial/ethnic groups. Hispanic Americans still appear to be less likely to be employed and African Americans more than their white counterparts.The analysis also shows that white and Asian women who are married to the husbands with large incomes tend to withdraw from the labor market while this pattern is not so obvious among African and Hispanic Americans. This finding may indicate that while white and Asian women withdraw from the labor market when their husbands earn enough income, African and Hispanic women withdraw from the labor market when they themselves do not possess enough human capital to participate in the labor market activity.

This study examines how retaining an immigrant culture affects school dropout rates among Vietnamese, Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Methods. I use 1990 Census data to analyze how language use, household language, and presence of immigrants in the household affect dropping out of school. Results. Overall, I found that these measures have similar effects on these diverse groups: bilingual students are less likely to drop out than English-only speakers, students in bilingual households are less likely to drop out than those in English-dominant or English-limited households, and students in immigrant households are less likely to drop out than those in nonimmigrant households. Conclusions. These findings suggest that those who enjoy the greatest educational success are not those who have abandoned their ethnic cultures and are most acculturated. Rather, bicultural youths who can draw resources from both the immigrant community and mainstream society are best situated to enjoy educational success.

In response to sharply rising housing prices in several key urban areas, an increasingly large number of advocates have been pushing a program of housing affordability. While incomes and house prices are relevant to the affordability debate, some advocates argue that increasing shortages of land mean that America is facing a housing crunch. In response, the advocates argue, there should be a strenuous policy of building affordable housing. This paper attempts to shed some light on the actual costs of housing within the United States. There is no question that there are some places where housing is expensive and scarce. But is this true throughout the U.S.? Is this true throughout even the expensive metropolitan areas? To help answer these questions, this paper examines the actual distribution of housing prices in American cities over the last 20 years. We then document a series of facts about American home prices. Since the cost of housing to affordability programs is the cost of construction, we particularly focus on the number of homes that are priced below construction costs . .