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Title: On the Political Economy of Immigration Amnesty

Citation Type: Miscellaneous

Publication Year: 2018

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Abstract: This article develops a politico-economic model of native preferences over illegal immigrants. In a referendum like scenario, native agents who may be high or low-skilled and belong to three generations vote on whether to grant amnesty to illegal immigrants, or support no change in their immigration status. Individual choices are aggregated to form the collective policy response, using majority-rule. In doing so, the article shows that economic incentives are driving the political impasse on a policy on illegal immigrants. If there were a vote on illegal immigrants, all generations of high-skilled agents vote against amnesty on account of the increased tax burden which are determined by a Utilitarian government. Low-skilled workers prefer amnesty as it increases the transfers received by them. The gains from additional transfers more than enough compensate for the loss in wages for the low-skilled. Finally, the article shows that an increase in the consumption tax rate can generate welfare gains for a majority of agents in the amnesty steady state and thus break the policy impasse on illegal immigration. JEL Classication Code: D580, J18, J610

Url: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2de7/960fb9534fc04893eacea4e5f9c6510a1edd.pdf

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Authors: Das, Arpan Mukherjee

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Data Collections: IPUMS USA

Topics: Migration and Immigration

Countries: United States