Full Citation
Title: Employment and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
Citation Type: Working Paper
Publication Year: 2004
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Abstract: There is a widespread belief among economists that the employment relationship ameliorates the adverse selection problem in health insurance. A job is a place where people come together for reasons other than health insurance.1 For example, the leading health economics text says ”group purchase by employers addresses the problem of adverse selection,” (Folland, Goodman, & Stano 2004) but this sentiment is repeated in many places (Gruber, 2000; Cutler, 2000; Buchmueller & Valetta, 2001). Understanding the connection between health insurance provision and the labor market is important. The labor market is the principal source for the private provision of health insurance in the United States, presumably because of the large subsidy for it in the tax code.2 A common justification for this system is that employer provision ameliorates the adverse selection problem in health insurance provision. However, to our knowledge no one has explored the conditions . . .
Url: http://www.umich.edu/~eriu/pdf/wp17.pdf
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Authors: Bhattacharya, Jayanta; Vogt, William B
Series Title: ERIU Working Paper
Publication Number: 17
Institution: University of Michigan
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Publisher Location: Ann Arbor, MI
Data Collections: IPUMS USA
Topics: Health, Other, Population Health and Health Systems
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