Full Citation
Title: Essais en Theorie du Furetage
Citation Type: Dissertation/Thesis
Publication Year: 2011
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Abstract: This thesis uses the search and matching theory to study the labor market. It has three chapters covering the following topics: the cycle behaviour of unem- ployment and vacancy; effects of labor market policy in developing countries; and wage dispersion among workers having similar characteristics. The first chapter contributes to solutions available in recent literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle through developing a very simple monopol- istic competition model. The key element that helps us to get more volatility in labor market variables is procyclical entry of firms that produces countercyclical markups. Following a positive productivity shock, vacancies increase and unem- ployment falls not just because of the entry of new firms, but also because existing firms restrict their output less and hire more since they are now face competition from more firm. Under plausible parameterizations, our model simulations can reach up to 50% of volatility of labor market key variables found in the data. The second studies the effects of Chinese Hukou system of household regis- tration (the law that limits migration the rural to the urban areas and vice-versa) on labor market outcomes. We find that if the Hukou system of household re- gistration is relaxed by either decreasing the law enforcement or allowing more people to live in the city, urban unemployment rate would be reduced. More re- laxed laws would help the urban sector become more attractive to rural residents, so firms hiring both illegal and legal Hukou status would benefit more from illegal worker since the rent firms extract from illegal workers is higher than that from legal workers and this in turn would induce firms to create more vacant positions. The third chapter proves that within a two-side asymmetric information environment, the take-it-or-leave-it offer mechanism can effectively explain why worker having similar characteristics are paid differently. The reason is through possessing private information, both firms and workers will make only modest wage offers to avoid separation, a mechanism that disperses the wage distribution.
Url: https://economie.esg.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2017/09/Dao_N_H_Thèse_2011.pdf
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Authors: HA DAO, NGOC
Institution: UNIVERSITE ́ DU QUE ́BEC A` MONTRE ́AL
Department: Economics
Advisor:
Degree: DU DOCTORAT EN E ́CONOMIQUE
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Pages: 105
Data Collections: IPUMS CPS
Topics: Population Data Science
Countries: United States