Full Citation
Title: Technical Change, Wage Inequality and Taxes: ONLINE APPENDIX
Citation Type: Journal Article
Publication Year: 2015
ISBN:
ISSN:
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140466
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Abstract: This paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design. A task-to-talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem. Technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks. The overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes, while raising those on middle to high incomes. The reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution, reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom.
Url: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20140466
Url: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/app/10510/20140466_app.pdf
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Authors: Ales, Laurence; Kurnaz, Musab; Sleet, Christopher
Periodical (Full): American Economic Review
Issue: 10
Volume: 105
Pages: 3061-3101
Data Collections: IPUMS CPS
Topics: Labor Force and Occupational Structure, Other
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