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Title: Congressional Apportionment and the Fourteenth Amendment

Citation Type: Miscellaneous

Publication Year: 2020

ISBN: 7065424421

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Abstract: This paper examines the coalitional stability of apportionment rules considered as part of the Fourteenth Amendment, assuming Congress limited itself to the eleven rules proposed by its members. Using each state's vote share as a measure of preference for various apportionment schemes, we find that the stability of legislative apportionment depended upon which states were seated in Congress as well as the voting threshold-majority, two-thirds, or three-fourths. Among all states, all eleven apportionment rules were in a top cycle under majority rule. A population-based apportionment, initially proposed by Representative James Blaine, made it out of committee and through both chambers of Congress largely because it was not voted upon against other proposals. Many of these rules provided greater vote shares for a majority of members than Blaine's and could have defeated that status quo just as easily. Our analysis raises questions about majority support for a portion of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866.

Url: http://users.wfu.edu/strumpks/PEConf_2020/dougherty_pittman_Wake_paper.pdf

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Authors: Dougherty, Keith L; Pittman, Grace

Publisher: University of Georgia

Data Collections: IPUMS USA, IPUMS NHGIS

Topics: Other

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