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Title: The Geography of Power: How Constituency Interest collided with Party Policy 1880-1894

Citation Type: Conference Paper

Publication Year: 2004

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Abstract: This paper focuses on two key industries, sugar and wool, and seeks to explain the costs and benefits for them in the tariff bills of 1883, 1890, and 1894. I rely on roll call voting, and archival evidence, e.g. congressional debates and newspaper articles, to illustrate the varied influence of these two industries in the respective chambers of Congress, and census data from 1880 and 1890 for the geographic distribution of these industries. By most accounts, formal lobbying by trade associations, as distinguished from outright bribery, did not begin until the 1920s. However, in trade policy, interests organized well before then, and engaged in both legal and illegal methods of influencing members of the House and Senate (Thompson 1985). Moreover, at the behest of industries in their districts and states, members themselves acted as self-appointed advocates. Did industries as early as the 1880s recognize the need to balance their powers in the House and Senate, and if so, what steps did they take to secure favorable policy in both chambers? Can any of the differences between the two chambers be attributed to location of key industries and lobbying efforts on behalf of these industries? How did party leaders in the chamber limit or promote the influence of individual industries?

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Authors: Schiller, Wendy J.

Conference Name: American Political Science Association

Publisher Location: Chicago, IL

Data Collections: IPUMS USA

Topics: Labor Force and Occupational Structure, Other

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