Full Citation

Title: Financial Disclosure Transparency and Employee Wages

Citation Type: Working Paper

Publication Year: 2022

ISBN:

ISSN:

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3103237

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Abstract: We test the hypothesis that less transparent financial disclosures are an undesirable firm attribute that increase the amount of information and unemployment risk that employees bear, resulting in a wage premium. Using establishment-level wage data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document that firms with less transparent disclosures pay their employees more, especially when employees bear greater information acquisition costs, have more influence in the wage-setting process, and own more stock. Our results hold after utilizing instrumental variables and exploiting two quasi-natural experiments. Overall, our results suggest that disclosure choices can generate externalities on an important group of stakeholders.

Url: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3103237

User Submitted?: No

Authors: Bai, John Jianqiu; Serfling, Matthew; Shaikh, Sarah

Series Title: SSRN

Publication Number: 3103237

Institution:

Pages: 1-47

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Data Collections: IPUMS CPS

Topics: Labor Force and Occupational Structure

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