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Title: Why Did Farmers Belong to Interest Groups? Evidence on the Causes of Membership from the Farmers' Alliance

Citation Type: Working Paper

Publication Year: 2010

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Abstract: Although Mancur Olsons model of selective incentives (1965) is a cornerstone of public choice theory, the model has not been carefully tested. Researchers have lacked representative data on interest group members and nonmembers or information about the economic benefit of membership. This paper tests Olsons model using data on the Farmers Alliance, a large and influential interest group in the late 1800s. Olsons model does not explain well the causes of membership in the Alliance. Analysis of wealth accumulation shows there was not an economic benefit of membership for the typical member and the economic benefit of membership did not influence the decision to join. Instead, the expected benefit of Alliance lobbying, a collective good, had the largest impact on the membership decision. These findings suggest the barriers to collective action in large interest groups are not as high as Olson supposed and help to explain the political power of farmers in U.S history.Keywords: Collective action, interest group, membership, selective incentives, collective benefitJEL Classifications: D71, D72, N41

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Authors: Stewart, James I.

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Data Collections: IPUMS USA

Topics: Other

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