This chapter discusses the recent history and current social and economic situations of contemporary immigrants from Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

The chapter argues that immigration from the Philippines and the nations of mainland Southeast Asia (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) has been the product of American military intervention. It considers how this intervention has shaped immigration from these locations.

While the economic effects of immigration have recently become topics of debate in the public arena, the debate is a long-standing one in the economics literature. The labor market effects of immigration have long been of interest to economists. Whereas theory predicts large negative effects on the wages of competing native-born workers from influxes of immigrants in local markets, the bulk of papers in the literature find only small effects. In this dissertation, I examine the impact of immigration on wages in the U.S. labor market. In the first essay, I show that many forces in the labor market confound the identification of the effect of immigration on wages of native-born. Using U.S. Census data, I find that the negative correlation between wages and immigration over 1960-2000 is driven entirely by low educated workers, and many demand-side trends over this period can equally explain the result.The conclusion of Chapter 2 resolves the conflict between the majority of studies and recent ones that use a skill-based methodology to estimate the impact on wages of natives. However, it does not resolve the divergence between theorys predictions and empirical evidence. In Chapter 3, I suggest how a reframing of the question of immigrations labor market effects. Namely, I present evidence that recent immigrants compete primarily with other immigrants, so that the strongest wage effects are found on immigrants rather than natives. Immigrant competition with other immigrants is likely substantial due to the imperfect substitutability of immigrants for native workers, segmentation of the labor market by ethnicity and language, and skyrocketing levels of immigration. In addition to estimating the effect of competition on the wages for all immigrants, I also analyze the effect on entry wages for new immigrants. Previous literature has established that entry wages of new immigrants declined over 1970-1990 and attributes this to declining unobserved quality. I find that up to forty percent of the declining entry wage can be explained by increasing competition among immigrants. This provides is a powerful alternative story to that of declining immigrant quality.

Following a Supreme Court decision in 1954, natural gas markets in the U.S. were subject to 35 years of intensive federal regulation. Several studies have measured the deadweight loss from the price ceilings that were imposed during this period. This paper concentrates on an additional component of welfare loss that is rarely discussed. In particular, when there is excess demand for a good such as natural gas for which secondary markets do not exist, an additional welfare loss occurs when the good is not allocated to the buyers who value it the most. We quantify the overall size of this allocated cost, its evolution during the post-war period, and its geographical distribution, and we highlight implications of our analysis for the regulation of other markets. Using a household-level, discrete-continuous model of natural gas demand we estimate that the allocated cost averaged $8.1 billion annually in the U.S. residential market for natural gas during 1950-2000, effectively doubling previous estimates of the total welfare losses from natural gas regulation. We find that these allocated costs were borne disproportionately by households in the Northeast, Midwest, and South Atlantic states. Costs were largest in New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts with 70% of all costs borne by the ten states affected most.

This study draws on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (N = 5,929) to analyze the moderating effects of race and marriage on the motherhood wage penalty. Fixed effects models reveal that for Hispanic women, motherhood is not associated with a wage penalty. For African Americans, only married mothers with more than 2 children pay a wage penalty. For Whites, all married mothers pay a wage penalty, as do all never-married mothers and divorced mothers with 1 or 2 children. These findings imply that racial differences in the motherhood wage penalty persist even for women with similar marital statuses, and they suggest that patterns of racial stratification shape womens family experiences and labor market outcomes.

Research on crime in the late 20th century has consistently shown that immigrants have lower rates of involvement in criminal activity than natives. We find that a century ago immigrants may have been slightly more likely than natives to be involved in crime. In 1904 prison commitment rates for more serious crimes were quite similar by nativity for all ages except ages 18 and 19 when the commitment rate for immigrants was higher than for the native born. By 1930, immigrants were less likely than natives to be committed to prisons at all ages 20 and older. But this advantage disappears when one looks at commitments for violent offenses. Aggregation bias and the absence of accurate population data meant that analysts at the time missed these important features of the immigrant-native incarceration comparison. The relative decline of the criminality of the foreign born reflected a growing gap between natives and immigrants at older ages, one that was driven by sharp increases in the commitment rates of the native born, while commitment rates for the foreign born were remarkably stable.

The western region of the United States has exhibited racial and ethnic diversity that rivals that found in any other part of the country. Yet the socioeconomic differences among western racial and ethnic groups have been studied much less intensively than corresponding differences in other regions of the United States. In this article we use data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series from 1940 through 2000 to describe the recent history of occupational inequality in the West. We find evidence of a persistent and significant occupational disadvantage for African Americans, Native Americans, and Mexicans. In contrast, the two Asian groups included in our analysis, Chinese and Japanese, frequently enjoyed an actual occupational advantage relative not only to other racial and ethnic minority groups but also to the majority native-born white population. Controlling for group differences in educational attainment explains much of the racial and ethnic variation in occupational inequality, but further analysis shows that it is inaccurate to assume that all groups enjoy the same occupational benefits from additional schooling. As a result, controlling for education without considering such differential occupational returns to schooling can yield a misleading picture of occupational inequality. Finally, we interpret these findings in relation to different theoretical perspectives on racial and ethnic inequality in the United States.

This paper exploits an unusual aspect of the policy for enforcement of the federal 1968 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which made filing an age discrimination claim less burdensome in some states than in others. After the enforcement of the federal law, white male workers over age 50 in states where the federal government allowed an easier filing procedure were .2 percentage points less likely to be hired than workers in states without laws. They also worked between .8 and 1.3 fewer weeks per year and were between .5 and .7 percentage points more likely to claim to be retired, between 1.6 and 1.8 percentage points more likely to be not in the labor force, and between 1.6 and 3 percentage points more likely to be not employed. These findings suggest that in an anti-age discrimination environment, firms seek to avoid litigation through means not intended by the legislation-by not employing older workers in the first place. Thanks to

Salsa has replaced ketchup as the most popular condiment. A mosque has been erected around the corner. The local hospital is staffed by Indian doctors and Philippine nurses, and the local grocery store is owned by a Korean family. A single elementary school may include students who speak dozens of different languages at home. This is a snapshot of America at the turn of the twenty-first century.The United States has always been a nation of immigrants, shaped by successive waves of new arrivals. The most recent transformation began when immigration laws and policies changed significantly in 1965, admitting migrants from around the globe in new numbers and with widely varying backgrounds and aspirations.This comprehensive guide, edited and written by an interdisciplinary group of prominent scholars, provides an authoritative account of the most recent surge of immigrants. Twenty thematic essays address such topics as immigration law and policy, refugees, unauthorized migrants, racial and ethnic identity, assimilation, nationalization, economy, politics, religion, education, and family relations. These are followed by comprehensive articles on immigration from the thirty most significant nations or regions of origin. Based on the latest U.S. Census data and the most recent scholarly research, The New Americans is an essential reference for students, scholars, and anyone curious about the changing face of America.

This article uses data from the 2005 U.S. Current Population Survey (the most recent data available) to describe the labor-force behavior of several racial/ethnic groups of workers age 55 and older. The discussion includes economic status and levels of part-time employment, self-employment, unemployment, and economic status. The authors also present information on the subjective views of labor- market experience held by older workers from different demographic groups, using recent data from the Health and Retirement Study. It is clear that the labor market and employment experiences of nonwhite and female workers are quite different from those of the more studied and better understood white male workers. The article raises many questions that researchers, policy makers, and business leaders need to address as the U.S. moves forward into the twenty-first century.

Educational homogamy (marriage between individuals of the same level of educational attainment) in Mexico and Brazil is declining significantly with the revolution in school attainment. In Mexico, over a mere three decades, the proportions finishing primary school doubled, rising from 40 percent for the 1931-40 birth cohort to 80 percent for those born 1961-70. In Brazil, where primary school consists of only four grades (compared to Mexico's six), the completion rate rose even more dramatically from 33 to 73 percent. Nevertheless these figures also show that in both countries sizeable fractions of the youngest generation did not complete primary schooling (one-fifth in Mexico and one-fourth in Brazil). Substantial inequalities of access to schooling persist. At the upper end of the educational spectrum, for these same cohorts the percentage of Mexican husbands with some university studies increased even more dramatically, from 5.1 to 13.2 percent and, for wives, from 1.1 to 8.3 percent. In Brazil the comparable figures are 2.2 to 5.8 percent and 0.6 to 5.7 percent, respectively. Marriage choice in both countries is strongly associated with levels of schooling completed-such as graduation from primary school, completion of basic or upper secondary, and attendance at or graduation from university. Years of schooling completed is not as salient. Thus, this research focuses on culturally significant categories rather than arbitrary number of years of schooling to compare patterns of marriage by educational attainment in the two countries. We analyze three successive ten-year birth cohorts, beginning with the 1931-40 generation, and take into consideration all marital unions, consensual as well as official. All coresident spouses in which either the husband or the wife was born between 1931 and 1970 are considered. The number of Mexican couples analyzed is 2,396,320 and Brazilian, 1,546,365. Our sources are high density integrated, anonymized census microdata samples obtained from https://www.ipums.org/international/index. html for the period 1970-2000. A series of nine log-linear models control for the unequal frequencies of various levels of educational attainment to reveal striking changes in the propensities of marriage within and between these groups. Log-odds ratios show universally positive homogamy for both countries, all censuses, and all levels of educational attainment except for one-where either the husband or the wife began but did not complete the secondary grades. (For this group, heterogamy was the rule in both countries and increased over time.) At the higher levels of educational attainment, homogamy is most extreme and is increasing in intensity over the generations, while at the lowest levels, homogamy is lower and declining slightly. Homogamy levels are much higher in Brazil than in Mexico, a finding which demonstrates the greater social inequalities in Brazil, and the fact that for Brazilians social mobility by means of education is more difficult than for Mexicans. These findings are suggestive rather than conclusive, and call for further research taking into account variables that influence educational attainment.

Do the houses of elderly homeowners appreciate at the same rate as the average house in their local market? As the population ages and retirees plan their financial future, homeowners need to project accurately the value of their single largest asset their house. The federal government is also concerned about the financial welfare of its elderly citizens and the solvency of the insurance for reverse mortgages. Using Health and Retirement Study data, we find that the houses of elderly (75 years old or older) homeowners appreciate 1 percentage point less per year in real terms than the houses of middle-aged (50 to 74 years old) homeowners. These estimates are smaller than the findings of Davidoff (2004), who used the American Housing Survey to show a 3-percentage-point slower house appreciation rate for homeowners aged 75 or older relative to that of all other homeowners. Using census microdata in nonlongitudinal form (1990 and 2000), we find 2.4-percentage-point slower real house appreciation for elderly homeowners. Houses of elderly homeowners thus appreciate in real terms at a 1- to 3-percentage-point discount relative to their local markets.

In the past two elections, richer people were more likely to vote Republican while richer states were more likely to vote Democratic. This switch is an aggregation reversal, where an individual relationship, like income and Republicanism, is reversed at some level of aggregation. Aggregation reversals can occur when an independent variable impacts an outcome both directly and indirectly through a correlation with beliefs. For example, income increases the desire for low taxes but decreases belief in Republican social causes. If beliefs are learned socially, then aggregation can magnify the connection between the independent variable and beliefs, which can cause an aggregation reversal. We estimate the model's parameters for three examples of aggregation reversals, and show with these parameters that the model predicts the observed reversals.

Homeownership is a principal indicator of achievement and integration for immigrants in the U.S., and this depends on their progress in education, English proficiency, and income, as their duration in the U.S. grows longer. The pace of advancement has varied across arrival cohorts, and immigrant groups are also different in their propensity of converting human capital to residential achievement. This study will use IPUMS microdata to track immigrant cohorts of ethnic Mexicans, Chinese, and Koreans, measuring their pace of change on different dimensions of human capital and economic achievement, and examining how their ability to translate these factors into residential integration has changed from 1970 to 2000. We also examine why Mexicans are so much more successful in becoming homeowners than their low levels of human capital would predict. The variable propensity to convert human capital into residential outcomes is a critical yet largely overlooked measure of the assimilation process.

This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter is about implications of tax reforms of 1980’s on married females’ labor force participation. The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the U.S. income tax structure in a dramatic fashion. These two reforms reduced the marginal tax rates for married households. In this paper I build a heterogeneous agent model populated by married households. Households differ by age and educational attainment levels of their members and decide whether the second earner, the wife, should participate in the market. I select parameter values so that the model economy is consistent with the 1980 U.S. economy in terms of income tax structure, wages (skill premium and gender gap), marital sorting (who is married with whom), and female labor force participation. In order to find the contribution of tax reforms to the rise in married female labor force participation, I simulate an economy with taxes of 1980 and allow wages and marital sorting take 1990 values. I show that about 28% of the rise in married female labor force participation (from 59% to 70%) between 1980 and 1990 can be accounted for by the changes in the income tax structure. The second chapter, written with Nezih Guner and Gustavo Ventura, studies the aggregate implications of different tax reforms with a new perspective. We develop a dynamic setup with heterogeneous married and single households, and with an operative extensive margin in labor supply. We restrict our model with observations on gender and skill premia, labor force participation across skill groups, and the structure of marital iv sorting. We then use this model to evaluate hypothetical reforms to the U.S. tax system. Replacing current income taxes by a proportional consumption tax increases steady-state output by about 10.5%. This increase is accompanied by differential effects on labor supply: while per-worker hours increase by about 3.0%, the labor force participation of secondary earners increases by 4.6% and married females increase their total hours by 7.6%. Married females account for about 51% of the total increase in labor hours. When current income taxes are replaced by a progressive consumption tax, married females account for a much larger (65.2%) share of the total increase in labor hours. Our results also show that the extent of the labor force participation by secondary earners, the wage structure (gender gap and skill premia), as well as the composition of pool of married individuals (who is married with whom) in the pre-reform economy affect aggregate outcomes in significant ways. The final chapter studies the implications of two important rules of Social Security System. The existing social security system in the U.S. has a special provision for married households: a spouse can choose between own benefits and half of the spouse’s benefits. Another feature of the system is the progressive calculation of benefits: benefits are determined by a concave function of past mean earnings. I develop an equilibrium life-cycle model to quantify the aggregate, cross-sectional, and welfare implications of three alternatives: elimination of the spousal benefit, elimination of the progressivity of benefits, and the two combined. Agents start out as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on the labor supply of its member(s) and saving. The aggregate production function has as inputs capital and v labor aggregated by efficiency. Eliminating the spousal benefit provision has substantial effects. The labor force participation of married women increases by 4.5% and households composed of men with relatively high education and women with relatively low education experience significant welfare losses. When only progressivity is eliminated, there is a decline in labor force participation of married females and households composed of men with relatively high education and women with relatively low education experience significant welfare gains. When both are eliminated, the labor force participation of married women increases and households composed of two members with high education gain most.

In brief, CHGIS (currently in Version 4) is a spatial database covering the period 222 BCE to 1911 CE. This database include the administrative hierarchy from the regime capital to the county (xian p) level. At present a varying number of towns (cunzhen ) within the county are included for two points in time: 1820 and 1911. Counties and towns are given as point files. Prefectures and higher order units are given as polygons for the territory administered and point files for the administrative capitals. County polygons are also available for 1911. The core datasets are gtime-seriesh which include all administrative changes dated to the year. The 1820 and 1911 datasets are gslices-in-timeh and pertain to the administrative structure and major towns around those years. The project currently aims to cover the eighteen core provinces, home to 90% of the population, with the exception of the dynastic coverage of the Qing empire in 1820.