This research project emphasizes the experiences of the participants to establish perceptions of the phenomenon feminism and gender discrimination. Findings were feminism is diverse and gender discrimination is evident. Utmost, the research revealed conclusively that all participants have experienced gender discrimination. Despite, there was not a universal belief of feminism or a consensus on its necessity. Highlighted were the aspects of nonfeminist and their relationships with their partner at home, the importance of children in the minds of the feminists, and each participant's perceptions of their childhood home. Concluding, the research proposes a modification to the Downing and Roush (1985) model of feminist identity development to include the process of raising children as an element in active commitment, stage V.

What impact does inequality have on metropolitan areas? Crime rates are higher in places with more inequality, and people in unequal cities are more likely to say that they are unhappy. There is also a negative association between local inequality and the growth of both income and population, once we control for the initial distribution of skills. What determines the degree of inequality across metropolitan areas? Twenty years ago, metropolitan inequality was strongly associated with poverty, but today, inequality is more strongly linked to the presence of the wealthy. Inequality in skills can explain about one third of the variation in income inequality, and that skill inequality is itself explained by historical schooling patterns and immigration. There are also substantial differences in the returns to skill, related to local concentrations in different industries, and these too are strongly correlated with inequality. * All three authors thank the Taubman Center for State and Local Government for financial support.

This book uses demographic data to show how broad social changes provided political opportunities that bolstered the social movements who successfully shaped the institutional commemoration of the Columbus Day holiday. Groups covered include Native Americans, Irish Americans, Catholics, Protestants, Italian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and African Americans.

The negative correlation between female employment and fertility in industrialized nations has weakened since the 1960s, particularly in the United States. We suggest that the continuing influx of low-skilled immigrants has led to a substantial reduction in the trade-off between work and childrearing facing American women. The evidence we present indicates that low-skilled immigration has driven down wages in the US child-care sector. More affordable child-care has, in turn, increased the fertility of college graduate native females. Although childbearing is generally associated with temporary exit from the labor force, immigrant-led declines in the price of child-care has reduced the extent of role incompatibility between fertility and work.

This paper uses data from the 1979 and 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth cohorts (NLSY79 and NLSY97) to estimate changes in the effects of ability and family income on educational attainment for youth in their late teens during the early 1980s and early 2000s. Cognitive ability plays an important role in determining educational outcomes for both NLSY cohorts, while family income plays little role in determining high school completion in either cohort. Most interestingly , we document a dramatic increase in the effects of family income on college attendance (particularly among the least able) from the NLSY79 to the NLSY97. Family income has also become a much more important determinant of college 'quality' and hours/weeks worked during the academic year (the latter among the most able) in the NLSY97. Family income has little effect on college delay in either sample. To interpret our empirical findings on college attendance, we develop an educational choice model that incorporates both borrowing constraints and a 'consumption' value of schooling-two of the most commonly invoked explanations for a positive family income-schooling relationship. Without borrowing constraints, the model cannot explain the rising effects of family income on college attendance in response to the sharply rising costs and returns to college experienced from the early 1980s to early 2000s: the incentives created by a 'consumption' value of schooling imply that income should have become less important over time (or even negatively related to attendance). Instead, the data are more broadly consistent with the hypothesis that more youth are borrowing constrained today than were in the early 1980s.

We estimate trends in intergenerational economic mobility by matching men in the Census to synthetic parents in the prior generation. We find that mobility increased from 1950 to 1980 but has declined sharply since 1980. While our estimator places greater weight on location effects than the standard intergenerational coefficient, the size of the bias appears to be small. Our preferred results suggest that earnings are regressing to the mean more slowly now than at any time since World War II, causing economic differences between families to become more persistent. However, current rates of positional mobility appear historically normal.

Between 1970 and 1992 growth in spending on health care services in the U.S. outpaced total consumption growth by 3.5 percent per year, and the share of spending devoted to health services doubled from 7.3 percent to 14.6 percent. Since 1992 the growth rate of spending on health care services has averaged only 0.5 percentage points faster than growth in total consumption, and thus the share devoted to health services rose much more modestly, to 15.6 percent as of 2006. This break in trend cost growth can be traced directly back to quantities and relative prices of factor inputs. Between 1970 and 1992 the share of the labor force working in health services and the relative earnings of health workers both rose dramatically, causing total health spending to surge. After 1992, the share of the labor force working in health services grew more slowly while the relative price of labor in health services stabilized at the new higher level.

In this chapter we revisit the relationship between income and fertility. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that fertility is negatively related to income in most countries at most times. Several theories have been proposed in the literature to explain this somewhat puzzling fact. The most common one is based on the opportunity cost of time being higher for individuals with higher earnings. Alternatively, people might differ in their desire to procreate and accordingly some people invest more in children and less in market-specific human capital and thus have lower earnings. We revisit these and other possible explanations. We find that these theories are not as robust as is commonly believed. That is, several special assumptions are needed to generate the negative relationship. Not all assumptions are equally plausible. Such findings will be useful to distinguish alternative theories. We conclude that further research along these lines is needed.

Carbon dioxide emissions may create significant social harm because of global warming, yet American urban development tends to be in low density areas with very hot summers. In this paper, we attempt to quantify the carbon dioxide emissions associated with new construction in different locations across the country. We look at emissions from driving, public transit, home heating, and household electricity usage. We find that the lowest emissions areas are generally in California and that the highest emissions areas are in Texas and Oklahoma. There is a strong negative association between emissions and land use regulations. By restricting new development, the cleanest areas of the country would seem to be pushing new development towards places with higher emissions. Cities generally have significantly lower emissions than suburban areas, and the city-suburb gap is particularly large in older areas, like New York.

This paper investigates the evolution and determinants of human capital at the local labor market level. Using a combination of U.S. data sets, I decompose generation-to-generation changes in local human capital into three factors: the previous generations human capital, intergenerational transmission of skills from parents in the previous generation to their children, and migration of the children. I measure skills with a prediction of earnings conditional on individual characteristics and use county groups called commuting zones as local labor markets. I find evidence of regression to the mean of local skills through intergenerational transmission, but selective migration allocates skills back toward local labor markets with high skills in the previous generation. Labor market size, climate, local colleges, and taxes affect local skill measures. Skills move from urban to rural labor markets through intergenerational transmission but from rural to urban labor markets through migration. Amenities are negatively correlated with local skill levels. Local supply of college services is positively correlated with local skill levels.

Carbon dioxide emissions may create significant social harm because of global warming, yet Americanurban development tends to be in low density areas with very hot summers. In this paper, we attemptto quantify the carbon dioxide emissions associated with new construction in different locations acrossthe country. We look at emissions from driving, public transit, home heating, and household electricityusage. We find that the lowest emissions areas are generally in California and that the highest emissionsareas are in Texas and Oklahoma. There is a strong negative association between emissions and landuse regulations. By restricting new development, the cleanest areas of the country would seem to be pushing new development towards places with higher emissions. Cities generally have significantly lower emissions than suburban areas, and the city-suburb gap is particularly large in older areas, like New York.

The United States provides a path to citizenship for its newcomers. Unlike other immigrationcountries, however, the United States does not have policies that ease assimilation or directlypromote naturalization such as easily accessible and widely advertised language and civicinstruction courses. Immigrants are by and large left on their own when facing legal and financialbarriers or seeking instruction to pass the citizenship test. Not surprisingly, thus, we find thatimmigrants attributes such as educational attainment, English language proficiency, and incomeaffect naturalization rates. This paper analyzes whether naturalization rates are also affected byneighborhood characteristics and informal networks for assistance and information. Towards thatend, we estimate a binary model of immigrants citizenship status specifying the size of theimmigrant enclave and its level of assimilation as key explanatory variables. The study uses2005 ACS data, and focuses on immigrants from the Caribbean islands in the New York area.The results suggest that who they are and where they live has substantial impacts on immigrantspropensities to have acquired US citizenship. Citizenship is unlikely for recent arrivals, thosewho do not speak English well, are poorly educated, and have a low income. Moreover, living ina neighborhood with a well assimilated immigrant enclave enhances the chance of acquiring UScitizenship. This effect is stronger for highly educated than for poorly educated immigrants andthus misses the more vulnerable segments of the immigrant population.

Social capitals popularity is due to its commensurability with community-centered strategies on the one hand, and neoliberalist state retraction on the other. But, as scathing critiques have asserted, expanding trust and reciprocity cannot overcome social inequality and health disparities. This paper addresses these critiques by proposing a disruptive social capital framework. Disruptive social capital highlights the simultaneous advantages and disadvantages embedded in social capital that result in enhanced health, but also illness, injury, or death. An analysis of interviews with 52 Filipino men living with HIV/AIDS in Los Angeles shows the inextricable nature of these (dis)advantages.

Carbon dioxide emissions may create significant social harm because of global warming, yet American urban development tends to be in low density areas with very hot summers. In this paper, we attempt to quantify the carbon dioxide emissions associated with new construction in different locations across the country. We look at emissions from driving, public transit, home heating, and household electricity usage. We find that the lowest emissions areas are generally in California and that the highest emissions areas are in Texas and Oklahoma. There is a strong negative association between emissions and land use regulations. By restricting new development, the cleanest areas of the country would seem to be pushing new development towards places with higher emissions. Cities generally have significantly lower emissions than suburban areas, and the city-suburb gap is particularly large in older areas, like New York.

The helpers at the nest hypothesis suggests that individuals who are not currently reproducing often help kin by care-taking and thereby increase their inclusive fitness. Using a large scale historical dataset (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series sample of 1910; n=13,935), the hypothesis is tested that childless couples are more likely to fulfill such a role by taking care of a niece or nephew, but not a parent, than couples with children. Childless couples were significantly more likely to take care of a niece or nephew than couples with children. In contrast, couples with children and childless couples did not differ in care-taking of parents. Childless couples were also more likely to have more and younger nieces/nephews in their home than couples with children.

We are grateful to Richard Arnott and three anonymous referees for their very valuable comments and suggestions. 2 Abstract: We explore the interaction of inter-city and intra-city compensating wage differentials by occupation. Our conjecture is that more central occupations receive higher wage premiums in larger cities, since workers in those occupations face a less desirable locus of housing prices and commuting times than those who have jobs in residential areas. The two main contributions of the paper are: 1) construction of an index of occupational centralization that accounts for differences between the density of employment where job holders in an occupation work and the overall employment density pattern, and 2) empirical confirmation that compensating differentials in larger cities are larger for more central occupations. The results are robust to the inclusion of individual-specific human capital variables and city-specific controls. These findings have implications for wage indexes used to construct real wage measures for academic research or in funding formulas where resource allocations are adjusted for labor cost differences across areas.