Multidimensional databases are the core of business intelligence systems. Their users express complex OLAP queries, often returning large volumes of facts, sometimes providing little or no information. Thus, expressing preferences could be highly valuable in this domain. The OLAP domain is representative of an unexplored class of preference queries, characterized by three peculiarities: preferences can be expressed on both numerical and categorical domains; they can also be expressed on the aggregation level of facts; the space on which preferences are expressed includes both elemental and aggregated facts. In this paper, we present MYOLAP, an approach for expressing and evaluating OLAP preferences, devised by taking into account the three peculiarities above. We first propose a preference algebra where users are enabled to express their preferences, besides on attributes and measures, also on the aggregation level of facts, for instance, by stating that monthly data are preferred to yearly and daily data. Then, with respect to preference evaluation, we propose an algorithm called WEST that relies on a novel graph representation where two types of domination between sets of facts may be expressed, which considerably improves efficiency. The approach is extensively tested for efficiency and effectiveness on real data, and compared against two other approaches in the literature.

For many entrepreneurs, the American Dream remains only partially fulfilled. Unequal outcomes between the middle and lower classes, men and women, and Latino/as, whites, and blacks highlight continuing inequalities and constraints within American society. With a focus on a diverse group of Latino entrepreneurs, this book explores how class, gender, race, and ethnicity all shape Latino entrepreneurs' capacity to succeed in business in the United States.

The authors use a multitude of data sources to provide a comprehensive, multidimensional decomposition of wages across both time and educational status. Their results confirm the importance of investments in and use of technology, which has been the focus of most of the previous literature. The authors also show that demand and supply factors played very different roles in the growing wage gaps of the 1980s and 1990s.

This paper investigates the role of changes in culture in generating the dramaticincrease in married women's labor force participation over the last century. It developsa dynamic model of culture in which individuals hold heterogeneous beliefs regardingthe relative long-run payo s for women who work in the market versus the home. Thesebeliefs evolve endogenously via an intergenerational learning process. Women are as-sumed to learn about the long-term payo s of working by observing (noisy) private andpublic signals. This process generically generates the S-shaped gure for female laborforce participation found in the data. I calibrate the model to several key statisticsand show that it does a good job in replicating the quantitative evolution of femaleLFP in the US over the last 120 years. I also examine the model's cross-sectional andintergenerational implications. The model highlights a new dynamic role for changesin wages via their e ect on intergenerational learning. The calibration shows that thisrole was quantitatively important in several decades.

As overall income inequality grew in the last four decades, high- and low-income families have become increasingly less likely to live near one another. Mixed income neighborhoods have grown rarer, while affluent and poor neighborhoods have grown much more common. In fact, the share of the population in large and moderate-sized metropolitan areas who live in the poorest and most affluent neighborhoods has more than doubled since 1970, while the share of families living in middle-income neighborhoods dropped from 65 percent to 44 percent. The residential isolation of the both poor and affluent families has grown over the last four decades, though aand affluent families have been generally more residentially isolated than poor families during this period. Income segregation among African Americans and Hispanics grew more rapidly than among non-Hispanic whites, especially since 2000. These trends are consequential because people are affected by the character of the local areas in which they live. The increasing concentration of income and wealth (and therefore of resources such as schools, parks, and public services) in a small number of neighborhoods results in greater disadvantages for the remaining neighborhoods where low- and middle-income families live.

We use data from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, and the 2000 U.S. decennial census to analyze how occupational risk relates to the earnings of Hispanic immigrant men. Our findings indicate that those with limited English-language fluency received significantly higher compensating wages in unsafe jobs than their English-fluent counterparts. The larger occupational-risk premiums accrued by limited-English-proficient (LEP) foreign-born Hispanic men also hold when further including U.S.-born Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, and non-Hispanic White men in the sample. These findings are consistent with underlying differences in preferences toward wages versus safety between LEP and English-proficient workers and/or differences in coverage under formal workers compensation programs, perhaps because undocumented workers (many of whom already faced hazardous conditions when migrating illegally to work in the United States) comprise a disproportionate share of the LEP. However, our data and methodologies do not allow us to determine whether these premiums adequately compensate the LEP for the occupational risk they undertake.

Workers in the US lacking English-language fluency earn less on average than their English-proficient counterparts, although this limited-English-proficient (LEP) earnings "penalty" has not remained stable over time. Using Integrated Public Use Microdata Series data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial US censuses as well as the 2005 American Community Survey, we show that this average penalty seemingly fell between 1980 and 2005 for Hispanic men in the US. We interpret this decline as evidence that an increase in the relative demand for LEP Hispanics could have offset the increase in their relative labor supply, particularly during the 1980s. However, when comparing workers who completed high school with those who did not, this penalty increased among high school graduates during this time. This policy-relevant finding is consistent with the increasing returns to skill observed in the US during the past couple of decades.

This study examines the effect of current levels of paid sick days coverage among private sector employees on self-reported health status, delays in medical care, and emergency department visits, and estimates savings in selected health care costs that would accrue if paid sick days were available to all private sector workers. This report is part of a broader body of research by the Institute for Womens Policy Research on the costs and benefits of paid sick days. This research was made possible by grants from the Ford Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Open Society Foundations.

Stratification research focuses on race, class, and gender, but often overlooks religion, which also shapes identity. Although some scholars predict the decline of religion as an organizing principle in modern society, they nonetheless agree that to the extent religion remains predictive of adult social and economic outcomes, religious behaviors formed in college tend to persist into adulthood. A shortage of longitudinal measures of religiosity limits previous attempts to measure religious decline in college, and its associations with indicators of social mobility, like academic achievement. Because elite institutions recruit racial/ethnic minority and immigrant students, and these students comprise America's future leadership, studies of their religious change is critical. Using a racially diverse sample of students at 28 elite institutions, this study finds declining religious participation in college, but declines do not disrupt lasting path dependencies between childhood and college religiosity and academic performance, particularly for racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants.

I use the Fragile Families data to examine how a diverse group of men can be classified into multiple forms of masculinity. I identify three ideal categorizations of masculinity: the traditional, contemporary, and hyper-masculine models. Cluster analysis results confirm that these categories differentiate forms of masculinity among fathers to create three distinct categories of masculinity. I find a contemporary masculinity category that displays the most socio-economic advantages and "positive" qualities of masculinity. Contemporary masculinity is characteristic of fathers who are egalitarian, emotionally available to the baby’s mother, more likely to be married and educated, and the least likely to have ever been incarcerated. Alternatively, the hyper-masculine fathers have the most abusive behaviors, least emotional availability, and are the least likely to be married and educated, while being the most likely to have ever been incarcerated. The last group of fathers is the traditionally masculine fathers who essentially fall in between the contemporary and hyper-masculine fathers. My final two research questions examine if masculinities influence men’s intimate and fathering relationships. Using multinomial regression models, I address if masculinity predicts whether fathers transition into a more or less committed relationship with their child’s mother between the birth of the child and the child’s fifth birthday. I find that intimate relationships, do indeed, differ by forms of masculinity. Contemporary fathers are the most likely and hyper-masculine fathers are the least likely to be continuously married. Hyper-masculine fathers are much more likely to transition into a less committed relationship than to either remain in the same type of relationship or transition into a more committed relationship. Lastly, I use OLS regression models to address whether forms of masculinity are related to father involvement, specifically distinguishing the amount of time fathers engage with their child, five years after the child’s birth. My findings suggest that fathers within the traditional masculinity category are the least involved with their child. Critically, hyper-masculine fathers are significantly more involved . . .

Scholars interested in race inequality have been particularly attracted to network accounts of the stratifying effects of social networks in the labor market. A recurring theme in policy-oriented research on poverty is that institutional connections can be engineered to create connections between job seekers and employers in ways that parallel social network processes. Yet, there has been little empirical research on how such linkages work across the various steps of the recruitment, screening, and hiring process. We examine how labor market intermediaries can serve as functional substitutes for social network processes for disadvantaged workers. Consistent with policy arguments about the desirability of creating connections to employers, applicants who are connected to this employer via formal labor market intermediaries exhibit a number of the advantages experienced by those applying to the firm via social network ties. Across the two stages of the hiring process, the net result is that applicants with such created connections are more likely to be offered jobs, and ultimately hired than other groups of applicants. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for research on labor market intermediation and other forms of brokerage and the feasibility of policy efforts to create connections in the labor market.

In absence of a model-based measure of occupational skill-intensity, the literature on wage inequality cannot consistently track technological progress on occupational level - a key ingredient of recent theories of labor market polarization. In this paper, I use the March CPS data from 1983 to 2002 to estimate such a measure corresponding to occupation-specific relative productivities of college and high-school educated. With imperfect substitution across skill types, the measurement of relative productivities requires estimation of substitution elasticities, and I propose a simple strategy to obtain these. The resulting measure is used to shed light on the modified skill-biased technological change hypothesis proposed by Autor et al. (2006).

In the 2006 American Community survey (ACS), 6% of respondents with Latin American ancestry answered "no" when asked whether they were Hispanic themselves. Conventional definitions of the Hispanic population exclude such respondents as "not Spanish/Hispanic/ Latino" even though they are self-identified Latin American descendants. Since their exclusion may bias our assessments of Hispanic social mobility, it is important to know more about them. Non-Hispanic identification is most common among Latin American descendants who 1) list both Latin American and non-Latin American ancestries, 2) speak only English, and 3) identify as White, Black, or Asian when asked about their "race." Ancestry and racial identity are considerably more influential than respondents' education, income, place of birth, or place of residence. These findings support both traditional straight-line assimilation and a more recent racialized assimilation theory in explaining discrepant responses to the ethnicity and ancestry questions among Latin American descendants.

As immigrants adapt to their new country, they not only increase their homeownership propensities, but they also become more likely to form independent households. But how do they compare with native-born residents, who also progress over time? This paper examines residentialassimilation of five young immigrant cohorts in Los Angeles and Toronto over a five year period in the early 2000s. Results show that while immigrants enjoy significant progress, there are large variations between sub-groups.The Chinese have been cast as housing high achievers, attaining homeownership by compressing rates of household formation. In contrast, "low" achievers, such as black immigrants, have the highest rates of household formation alongside the lowest rates of ownership. Regarding cross-country differences, we interpret that racial groups share the same culture and having a similar desire to own homes in both countries, and that variable rates of household formation represent a household strategy to achieve homeownership in the face of different assimilation contexts. The findings strongly support the need to account for household formation in the study of homeownership attainment.

Le Gouvernement algérien décidait - comme suite à la prise de contrôle de ses ressources en hydrocarbures et pétrolières - de mettre unilatéralement un terme, en 1973, aux flux de l’émigration perçue essentiellement comme un versant du post-colonialisme. Cette politique a été poursuivie au cours des trois décennies ayant suivies, avec pour conséquence principale qu’aucune vague massive d’émigration aussi bien de main d’œuvre que de migration forcée n’a été enregistrée au départ de l’Algérie et ce, malgré des taux de chômage alarmants et les événements tragiques ayant traversé les années 1990. Il reste à signaler, toutefois, que, au cours de cette période, l’émigration s’inscrivait davantage au cœur d’un schéma de réunification avec la famille française. En tant que tels, les émigrants algériens n’étaient pas intégrés dans les dispositifs existants de promotion du retour des émigrés vers le pays d’origine dans la mesure essentielle où ils étaient, avant tout, perçus comme des ‘soupapes de sûreté’ à l’équilibre du marché local du travail (Fargues, 2006). A partir des années 2000, une recrudescence des flux d’émigration de travailleurs algériens a été enregistrée et ce, quand bien même l'Etat - visant à diversifier et à augmenter ses revenus et à rendre plus attractifs les investissements -, proposait une politique de libéralisation plus profonde de l’économie algérienne déséquilibrée par des taux de chômage importants relevés surtout parmi les profils hautement qualifiés. Cette nouvelle vague d’émigration revêt aujourd’hui de nouveaux visages . . .

The conventional wisdom is that due to intense discrimination, prior to the Civil Rights era blacks of all classes lived side by side. Individual socioeconomic status did not translate into improved locational outcomes according to this view. But several historical case studies suggest that upper-stratum blacks did indeed live in neighborhoods set apart from their poorer brethren. This study uses individual-level data from the 19101950 Public Use Microdata Samples to investigate how individual-level socioeconomic status translated into neighborhood-level outcomes for blacks. The study finds that among blacks, individual-level socioeconomic status played no role in determining residential proximity to whites. For blacks individual socioeconomic status was, however, an important determinant of other neighborhood outcomes.