This study tests the impact of household and demographic factors on the economic well-being of the farm and nonfarm self-employed using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Parametric and nonparametric techniques are used to test for statistical differences in selfemployment and household income levels. Further, household and demographic factors are tested for their effect on self-employment income using a censored tobit regression model. Findings indicate the farm self-employed report significantly higher levels of self-employment income than the nonfarm self-employed. Several household and demographic factors significantly impact self-employment income levels for the farm and nonfarm self-employed.

Research on child custody primarily focuses on the well-being of children following divorce. We extend this literature by examining how the prospect of joint child custody affects marriage-specific investment in childrens private-school education. Variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states proxies for the prospect of joint child custody and provides a natural experiment framework with which to examine marriage-specific investment in children. The probability of childrens private school attendance declines by 13 percent in states that adopt joint-custody laws. The effects of joint-custody reform are larger in states that have property-division laws that consistently favor one parent over the other. The results are largely robust for subsamples partitioned by socioeconomic status.

There is widespread concern that the United States faces a problem in maintaining its position as the scientific and technological leader in the world and that loss of leadership threatens future economic well-being and national security. Business, science, and education groups have issued reports that highlight the value to the country of leadership in science and technology. Many call for new policies to increase the supply of scientific and engineering talent in the United States. While the reports differ in emphasis, the basic message is uniform: the United States should spend more on research and development (R&D) and increase the number of young Americans choosing scientific and technological careers. In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush announced the American Competitiveness Initiative that concurred with these assessments: "For the U.S. to maintain its global economic leadership, we must ensure a continuous supply of highly trained mathematicians, scientists, engineers, technicians, and scientific support staff." In 1957, faced with the analogous challenge of Sputnik, the United States responded with increased R&D spending and by awarding large numbers of National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate Research and National Defense Education Act fellowships, which together induced a large number of young Americans to invest in science and engineering careers. In the early 1960s, the country gave about one thousand NSF graduate research fellowships per year. Forty-five years later, despite a more-than-threefold increase in the number of college students graduating in science and engineering and a global challenge from the spread of technology and higher education to the rest of the world, the United States still gives the same number of NSF fellowships. With so many more college students, current U.S. NSF fellowship policy gives less of an incentive for students to enter science and engineering than did policies in the earlier period.

The Indian Gaming Regulation Act was passed in 1988, and in subsequent years, tribal gaming revenues increased dramatically. However, it has been unclear how tribal casinos impact different types of American Indian households well-being. I apply a difference-in-difference methodology to 1990 and 2000 data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to address this question. When casino effects are split by householders sex and education, they are primarily on female-headed households. Casinos significantly increase household per capita income of female-headed households without a high school degree by $891 to $1859. However, casinos reduce per capita assistance income of all female-headed households. Casinos also reduce deep poverty rates of female-headed households with at least a high school degree by seven to eight percentage points and near poverty rates of female-headed households with less than a high school degree by 11 to 14 percentage points.

We use here a new measure of household economic well-being called LIMEW. LIMEW is different in scope from the official U.S. Census Bureau measure of gross money income (MI) in that it includes taxes, noncash transfers, public consumption, income from wealth, and household production. We analyze trends in LIMEW from 1959 to 2004, and find that median LIMEW grew by 0.7 percent per year while median MI increased by 0.6 percent per year. LIMEW grew much slower than MI from 1959 to 1982, and much faster than MI from 1982 to 2004. In 2004, measured inequality was lower in LIMEW than MI (a difference of 5.5 Gini points); similarly, the increase in inequality between 1959 and 2004 was higher in MI than LIMEW (6.2 versus 5.1 Gini points). Much of the difference in these measures can be traced to the role of net government expenditures. According to both measures, the racial gap narrowed from 1959 to 1989; it then widened somewhat from 1989 to 2004 according to LIMEW but continued to narrow according to MI. The difference in time trends can be traced mainly to the rising income from wealth of white households relative to nonwhite households. The gap in well-being between single females and married couples widened from 1959 to 1989 and then narrowed slightly between 1989 and 2004 according to LIMEW but increased rather steadily from 1959 to 2004 according to MI. The fortunes of the elderly relative to the nonelderly showed considerable improvement from 1959 to 2004 according to LIMEW, almost reaching parity in 2004. In contrast, according to MI, the relative position of the elderly was about the same in 2004 as in 1959. In this instance, the difference in time . . .

We examine the evolution of racial economic inequality using the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW), a comprehensive household income measure that incorporates amount of wealth, taxes and transfers, spending on public goods, and the value of household production. Analyzing shifts in racial inequality for the between benchmark LIMEW years 1959, 1972, 1982, 1989, 2000, 2004 and 2007, we show that reductions in overall racial inequality in the 1960s were sustained through the 1980s, but that in the 1990s there was a marked increase driven by an increase in the concentration of wealth among white households. While spending on education and progressive tax policies helped alleviate racial disparities, transfers have had little impact on racial inequality. We also show that much of the racial inequality is driven by within raceinequality as opposed to between race inequality.

The picture of economic well-being is crucially dependent on the yardstick used to measure it. The LIMEW is different in scope from the official US Census Bureau measure of gross money income (MI) in that our measure includes public consumption, income from wealth, and household production. In previous work, Wolff and Zacharias (2007) found that the median U.S. household was much better off in 2001 relative to 1989 according to LIMEW in comparison to MI. They also found that the racial gap widened according to LIMEW, while MI suggested a mild improvement. On the other hand, the hump-shaped relationship between age and economic well-being was not found when the LIMEW is used as the yardstick, due to the higher relative well-being of the elderly. Measured inequality was lower according to LIMEW than gross money income but the increase between 1989 and 2001 was higher for the LIMEW. In the current study, we extend the LIMEW backward in time to 1959. We find that median LIMEW and MI grew at about the same annual rate from 1959 to 2000 but LIMEW grew much slower from 1959 to 1982 and much faster from 1982 to 2000. Second, LIMEW showed a greater increase in inequality from 1959 to 2000 than MI (7.1 versus 5.7 Gini points), and particularly from 1959 to 1982. Third, the racial gap in mean values narrowed from 1959 to 1989 according to both measures but then widened from 1989 to 2000 according to LIMEW but continued to narrow according to MI.

This paper empirically assesses the theory of interpersonal income comparison using individual level data on suicide deaths in the United States. We model suicide as a choice variable, conditional on exogenous risk factors, reflecting an individual's assessment of current and expected future utility. Our empirical analysis considers whether suicide risk is systematically related to the income of others, holding own income and other individual factors fixed. We estimate proportional hazards and probit models of the suicide hazard using two separate and independent data sets: (1) the National Longitudinal Mortality Study and (2) the Detailed Mortality Files combined with the 5 percent Public Use Micro Sample of the 1990 decennial census. Results from both data sources show that, controlling for own income and individual characteristics, individual suicide risk rises with reference group income. This result holds for reference groups defined broadly, such as by county, and more narrowly by county and one demographic marker (e.g., age, sex, race). These findings are robust to alternative specifications and cannot be explained by geographic variation in cost of living, access to emergency medical care, mismeasurement of deaths by suicide, or by bias due to endogeneity of own income. Our results confirm findings using self-reported happiness data and are consistent with models of utility featuring external habit or Keeping Up with the Joneses preferences.Keywords: Relative income, interpersonal comparisons, interdependent preferences, suicide, happiness, Keeping Up with the JonesesJEL Classifications: I31, D6, H0, J0

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides a statutory framework for tribal gaming and stipulates that net gaming revenues must be used by tribes to foster economic development. After it was passed in 1988, tribal gaming revenues increased dramatically as did the number of tribal casinos. Using a difference-in-difference methodology with 1990 and 2000 Census data, I examine how the introductions of casinos impact the well-being of on reservation American Indians.In my first two chapters, I use aggregate reservation data. In Chapter 1, I use least squares. Casinos increase per capita income by about 8% and reduce family and child poverty rates by 4 to 5 percentage points. I find the largest casinos are associated with the largest increases in income and reductions in poverty. However, least squares will only be unbiased if the decision to open a casino is uncorrelated with unobservable heterogeneity in reservation per capita income or poverty. In Chapter 2, I control for this potential endogeneity of the casino choice variables by including instrumental variables and find income effects increase 2 to 4% but lose statistical significance. Poverty effects increase in magnitude to 11 to 14 percentage points for family poverty rates and 16 to 20 percentage points for child poverty rates. Hence, these results may mean tribes with fewer outside opportunities open casinos and least squares biases effects downwards. However, after dropping at least one instrument, there are problems with weak identification, income effects decline to almost zero, and poverty impacts are no longer significant but remain large in magnitude.In Chapter 3, I use 1990 and 2000 IPUMS-USA micro-data to examine impacts on household per capita total income, earned income, state and federal assistance income, and poverty according to head of household skill and market size. Casinos impacts are largest on low-skill heads but significance is dependent on the model used. If impacts vary by market size, income effects differ on the measure used and the sex of the head of household. On the other hand, with the exception of female headed families' near poverty rates, poverty rates decline more in larger markets.

Introduction: This report analyzes how well the residents of Washington Heights/Inwood (WH/IN) have fared on selected health indicators set forth by the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygene between 2000 and 2005. Methods: Data on Latinos and other racial/ethnic groups were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey, reorganized for public use by the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota, IPUMSusa. Cases in the dataset were weighted and analyzed to produce population estimates. Results: Immigrant families in particular face a multitude of health concerns, as well as specific barriers to accessing health care services. The socioeconomic and health disparities faced by WH/IN residents lead to the recognition that health promotion and disease management in immigrant communities such as WH/IN can be most effective by way of improvements in the socioeconomic conditions of residents. Although health insurance coverage has been found to be an important predictor of access to health care, our findings show that WH/IN residents are less likely to have health insurance than their NYC peers, with low-income Dominicans having the highest rate of Medicaid coverage among all foreign-born and Mexicans being the immigrant group most likely to be uninsured. In addition, over a third of the adult population in WH/IN was without a regular health-care provider in 2005. Discussion: Understanding the ecology of existing health disparities of immigrant communities such as the one in WH/IN may move NYC closer to meeting the unique needs of this growing population, both currently and in the future, and provide insights into how to address future immigrant health challenges.

Most of the policy debate about immigration in the United States is about the appropriate amount of immigration and the appropriate policies toward temporary workers and undocumented workers. These are primarily federal policy issues. But state and local policymakers face a different challenge: that of helping immigrants in their regions adjust to life in the United States, especially economic life. As a basis for state and local immigrant incorporation policy, this report will show how immigrants' economic well-being compares across metropolitan areas.

The California Report Card is a yearly report issued by Children Now that presents key indicators health, education, and family well-being, along with an assessment of policy and budget progress for children and families. The 2006-07 Report Card highlights gains made in health insurance coverage, preschool, and afterschool and issues a call to legislators and advocates to continue to pursue pro-child policies statewide.

This briefing paper focuses on the educational and health status of children and families on the California/Mexico border. Guided by input from community activists and local government officials, this briefing paper will present easy-to-understand stats on children and families, supplemented by case studies drawn from the border communities studied.

Report provides community-level data for child and family well-being, including economic, educational, and health elements. We sought to provide up-to-date information about the demographic and lifestyle characteristics of this region while challenging negative stereotypes about residents.

The United States of America has always been a nation of immigrantsa land of opportunity wherenewcomers can, through hard work and perseverance, achieve better lives for themselves andtheir families. But in todays world, realizing the American Dream is now almost impossible withoutat least some college education, and many immigrants face significant barriers to gaining accessto and succeeding in higher education. Higher education for immigrants isnt an issue narrowlyfocused on the well-being of these immigrants as individuals but has major implications for thenation as whole. As the United States moves into the 21st century as part of a global economy inwhich postsecondary education is a key to economic competitiveness, it is imperative to developpolicies at the federal, state, local, and institutional levels to help immigrants gain access to andsucceed in higher education. Without such policies, the nation may find itself with a workforce thatdoes not have sufficient education to enable the United States to remain economically competitive.

This paper investigates how unauthorized immigrants' illegal status affects their children's scholastic achievement in the U.S. The answer to this question calls attention to the intergenerational consequence of the U.S. immigration legislation. In order to estimate the intergenerational effect of immigration status, two sources of bias need to be overcome: 1) the omitted variables that determine both parental immigration status and children's scholastic performance; and 2) misreporting in legal status among illegal immigrants. The biggest amnesty program in U.S. history (IRCA 1986) and a two-step semi-parametric method are used to estimate the misreporting rate, as well as to recover the treatment effect of truly having legal status. My empirical analysis using the data of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey finds: Had the illegal Latina immigrant women who arrived in the U.S. during 1982-1986 migrated before 1982 and thus been granted legal status by IRCA, their children on average would have improved their math scores by 0.65 of a standard deviation and their reading scores by 0.50 of a standard deviation. The above results account for misreporting. The probability that the potential truly illegal Latina immigrant women misreport their legal status is estimated at around 0.46. This paper also finds that households' economic well-being, residential location, and residential instability are the three main mechanisms through which immigrants' legal status affects their children's scholastic performance. Keywords: Immigrant, legal status, educationJEL Classifications: J18, O15, R23

The Great Migration of southerners away from their region of birth stands as one of the most significant demographic events in U.S. history. The first waves of migrants headed primarily to the Northeast and Midwest. During and after World War II, a larger proportion moved to the West. We use information from the 1970 through 2000 public use samples to compare the economic status of onward migrants from the Northeast and Midwest with that of direct migrants from the South. Our findings show that onward migrants had greater incomes and higher occupational status, but were not more likely to be employed, than direct migrants with the same sociodemographic profiles. The economic advantages enjoyed by onward migrants were shared by blacks and whites, and prevailed across three of the four decades considered in our analysis.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the concept of social generation as it relates to the analysis of the distribution of well-being, and to compare American and French welfare regime dynamics. The French case is not unique in its generational imbalances; the United States also faces major generational imbalances. In previous publications on the social consequences of economic fluctuations, from the Trente glorieuses (1945-1975) to the Croissance ralentie (1975-today), I have demonstrated the existence in France of a generational cleavage (fracture gnrationnelle) between the generations born before 1955 (the early baby boom generations and the previous ones, who benefited most from the economic acceleration of the postwar period) and those born after 1955 (who are facing an economic slowdown, high youth unemployment, and the resulting social problems). Thus we find an insiderization of previous generations and an outsiderization of new ones. This generational cleavage is often denied by policymakers and in the public debate; however, the long-term implications of these generational dynamics could have major consequences for the stability of the welfare state. This cleavage may be less visible than those based on class, ethnic or gender inequalities, but it nevertheless alters the long-term sustainability of the system. After defining social generations, and briefly discussing some theories of generational dynamics, I will analyze the consequences of macroeconomic changes in the context of strong social regulation on the opportunities of successive generations. I will first consider the different dimensions of the generational cleavage in France and then discuss national specificities within a French-American comparison.

Using multiple births as an exogenous shift in family size, I investigate the impact of the number of children on child investment and child well-being. Using data from the 1980 US Census Five-Percent Public Use Micro Sample, 2SLS results demonstrate that parents facing a change in family size reallocate resources in a way consistent with Beckers Quantity & Quality model. A larger family generated by twins in a later birth reduces the likelihood that older children attend private school, reduces the mothers labor force participation, and increases the likelihood that parents divorce. The impact of family size on a measure of child outcome, such as grade retention, is less clear. The results indicate that for both measures of child investment and child well-being, the 2SLS estimates are statistically distinguishable from OLS estimates, indicating an omitted variables bias in the single equation model.