This paper uses immigration as a semi-natural experiment to investigate the in-tergenerational transmission of culture. The culture is proxied by rates of nonmarital fertility and age at the first birth in the immigrant's home-country. Using the Current Population Survey, Decennial Censuses, and American Community Survey data covering the years 1970-2020, we find that average outcomes in the home-country can explain a statistically significant portion of immigrants' behavior. Conditional on the individual, family, and home-country economic and demographic controls, a 1 percent increase in average rates of nonmarital fertility in mother's country of birth is associated with a 0.14 percentage points increase in the likelihood of nonmarital birth among second-generation women. A one year increase in age at first birth in mother's birthplace leads to 0.11 years increase in age at first birth among second-generations. Cohort analysis suggests that the intergenerational links are weaker among young cohorts and become smaller for recent cohorts. The results show that there are cultural factors associated with nonmarital fertility and age at the first birth that can be transmitted from one generation to the next.

The U.S. labor market is increasingly made up of immigrant workers, and considerable research has focused on occupational segregation as an indicator of their labor market incorporation. However, most studies focus on Hispanic populations, excluding one of the fastest growing immigrant groups: foreign-born blacks. Because of their shared race, African and Caribbean immigrants may experience the same structural barriers as U.S.-born blacks. However, researchers hypothesize that black immigrants are advantaged in the labor market relative to U.S.-born blacks because of social network hiring and less discrimination by employers. Using 2011–2015 pooled American Community Survey data, this study is among the first quantitative studies to examine black immigrants’ occupational segregation in the United States. The authors use the Duncan and Duncan Dissimilarity Index to estimate black immigrants’ segregation from U.S.-born whites and blacks and regression analyses to identify predictors of occupational segregation. Consistent with previous work focusing on Hispanic immigrants, foreign-born blacks are highly overrepresented in a few occupations. African and Caribbean immigrants experience more occupational segregation from whites than the U.S.-born, with African immigrants most segregated. Africans are also more segregated from U.S.-born blacks than Caribbean immigrants. Results of the regression analyses suggest that African immigrants are penalized rather than rewarded for educational attainment. The authors find that the size of the coethnic population and the share of coethnics who are self-employed are associated with a decline in occupational segregation. Future research is needed to determine the impact of lower occupational segregation on the income of self-employed black immigrants.

The purpose of this survey was to gather individual’s attitudes and feelings towards privacy and the selling of data. A total (N) of 1,107 people responded to the survey. We conducted an online survey through a distribution platform (Amazon’s Mechanical Turk) which has been developed through Qualtrics software.

Place-based jobs policies seek to create jobs in particular local labor markets. Such policies include business incentives provided by state and local governments, which cost almost 50 billion USD annually. The most persuasive rationale for these policies is that they can advance equity and efficiency by increasing long-term employment rates in distressed local labor markets. However, current incentives are not targeted at distressed areas. Furthermore, incentives have high costs per job created. Lower costs can be achieved by public services to business, such as manufacturing extension, customized job training, and infrastructure. Reforms to place-based jobs policies should focus on greater targeting of distressed areas and using more cost-effective policies. Such reforms could be achieved by state and local governments acting in their residents' interests or could be encouraged by federal interventions to cap incentives and provide aid to distressed areas.

COVID-19 has forced essentially all schools in the country to close their doors to inperson activities. In this study, we provide new evidence about variation in school responses across school types. We focus on five main constructs of school activity during COVID-19: personalization and engagement in instruction, personalization and engagement in other school communication with students, progress monitoring (especially assignment grading), breadth of services (e.g., counseling and meals), and equitable access (to technology and services for students with special needs). We find that the strongest predictor of the extent of school activities was the education level of parents and other adults in schools’ neighborhoods. Internet access also predicts school responses. Race, parent/adult income, and school spending do not predict school responses. Private schools shifted to remote learning several days faster than traditional public schools, though others eventually caught up. On some measures, charter schools exceeded the responses of other schools; in other cases, traditional public schools had the highest overall measures. States in the Midwest responded more aggressively than those in other regions, especially the South, even after controlling for the full set of additional covariates. Learning management systems were reported by a large majority of schools, followed by video communication tools and tutorial/assessment programs. Several methods are proposed and implemented to address differential website. We discuss potential implications of these findings for policy and effects on student outcomes.

This paper presents a new probabilistic method of record linkage, developed using the U.S. full count censuses of 1900 and 1910 but applicable to a range of different sources of historical records. The method was designed to exploit a more comprehensive set of individual and contextual characteristics present in historical census data, aiming to obtain a machine learning algorithm that better distinguishes between multiple potential matches. Our results demonstrate that the method achieves a match rate that is twice as high other currently popular methods in the literature while at the same time also achieving greater accuracy. In addition, the method only performs negligibly worse than other algorithms in resembling the target population.

A growing literature has used the intensity of the tasks that workers perform to explain labor market outcomes. Despite significant changes in the workplace, this "task approach" is based on the questionable assumption that the intensity of tasks remains constant over time. I harmonize and compare over time the intensity of four broad task classes that workers perform-non-routine cognitive, non-routine manual, interpersonal, and routine-in the Dictionary of Occupation Title (DOT) and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). I find the new fact that a sizable part of wage changes is due to increases in the return and the intensity of cognitive tasks. I show that my new fact has important implications for three well-documented wage trends during the last decades. First, it caused wage polarization because the intensities of cognitive tasks increased in both high-wage and low-wage occupations. Second, it increased the college premium because college graduates tend to work in occupations that are relatively intensive in cognitive tasks. Third, it reduced the gender-wage gap because women again tend to work in occupations that are relatively intensive in cognitive tasks.

In this data visualization, the authors examine how the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis in the United States has affected labor force participation, unemployment, and work hours across gender and parental status. Using data from the Current Population Survey, the authors compare estimates between February and April 2020 to examine the period of time before the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States to the height of the first wave, when stay-at-home orders were issued across the country. The findings illustrate that women, particularly mothers, have employment disproportionately affected by COVID-19. Mothers are more likely than fathers to exit the labor force and become unemployed. Among heterosexual married couples of which both partners work in telecommuting-capable occupations, mothers have scaled back their work hours to a far greater extent than fathers. These patterns suggest that the COVID-19 crisis is already worsening existing gender inequality, with long-term implications for women’s employment.

These three proposals-the Section 8 expansion, the LIFT Act, and the AFA-have been advanced or considered by Vice President Biden, Senator Harris, or both, and they each address a gap in coverage left by an existing policy. Given these similarities, this brief explores the impact of the Section 8 expansion on its own, as well the cumulative impacts it could have if it were implemented alongside the LIFT Act and the AFA. Our results focus on the impacts of these proposals on the national poverty rate and the child poverty rate, on the rate of deep poverty,7 and on racial and ethnic disparities in the incidence of poverty at the national level and for children. Policy Background Below, we describe the Section 8 expansion proposal, the LIFT Act, and the AFA. 8 The summaries also provide background information on the programs that these proposals build on: the existing Section 8 program, the EITC, and the Child Tax Credit.

Safety is an important dimension of access to green space. When parks are perceived as unsafe, people are unlikely to derive the health and community benefits from them. In this study, we examine inequities in green space access in five medium-to-large US cities using parcel-level, network-based analysis. We quantify access using three measures: proximity, congestion-weighted acreage, and crime-constrained proximity. We find that, in the five US cities studied, there is a striking lack of access to safe parks. In addition, inequalities between socioeconomic subgroups are substantially exacerbated when considering access to safe parks, with racial/ethnic minorities and low-income communities fairly consistently worse off. The results suggest that interventions to improve park safety could result in large and immediate improvements for access and environmental justice. However, even once these inequalities are addressed, there remains significant work to provide all residents with sufficient and proximal access to green space and the wide array of benefits that it has to offer.

We examine change in multiple indicators of gender inequality for the period of 1970 to 2018. The percentage of women (age 25 to 54) who are employed rose continuously until ∼2000 when it reached its highest point to date of 75%; it was slightly lower at 73% in 2018. Women have surpassed men in receipt of baccalaureate and doctoral degrees. The degree of segregation of fields of study declined dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s, but little since then. The desegregation of occupations continues but has slowed its pace. Examining the hourly pay of those aged 25 to 54 who are employed full-time, we found that the ratio of women’s to men’s pay increased from 0.61 to 0.83 between 1970 and 2018, rising especially fast in the 1980s, but much slower since 1990. In sum, there has been dramatic progress in movement toward gender equality, but, in recent decades, change has slowed and on some indicators stalled entirely.

To what extent does internal migration lead to upward mobility? Using within-brother variation and a new linked dataset from 1910 to 1940, I estimate that internal migrants were more likely to improve on their father’s percentile rank than non-migrants. On average, the effect of migration was nearly four times the effect of one year of education; for those raised in poorer households, migration’s effect was about nine times that of education. The evidence suggests that internal migration was a key strategy for intergenerational progress in a context of rapid industrialization, high rates of rural-to-urban migration and large interregional income gaps.

Higher education is a pathway to greater financial security and prosperity. The pandemic-induced recession illustrates how Georgians without degrees are most vulnerable during economic downturns, with unemployment rates for individuals with a high school education only—37 percent of adult Georgians—consistently double that of those with a college degree.[1],[2] Many jobs lost during recessions do not return, and almost all new jobs created during economic recoveries require some level of postsecondary education.[3] But students seeking a bachelor’s or associate degree or other postsecondary credentials often face financial roadblocks, including high costs that lead them into student debt. Growing student debt indicates the shift of risk and responsibility for paying for higher education to individuals from the public, yet the burden of excessive student debt spreads from individuals out to the economy. Seeing higher education as a private investment rather than a shared responsibility intensifies financial risk in an economy where postsecondary education is increasingly critical to achieving economic security. Debt burden varies widely by race, ethnicity and family wealth, and borrowers experience different challenges repaying debt based on their loan amounts and jobs they can get. Concerningly, borrowing rates and loan amounts are very high among Black students, whose college enrollment has grown quickly while state funding for colleges has declined and tuition increased. Debt is too risky for some low-income students who choose not to borrow and face difficult tradeoffs that can hurt their chances of going to college, getting a degree and achieving financial security. Student loans allow for-profit colleges, which disproportionately enroll Black women, to charge high prices for credentials that often fail to provide an adequate return in the workforce. Those hardest hit are the students who borrow and do not graduate, and graduation rates are lower for students from low-income families and Black students who face multiple and cumulative financial, institutional and academic barriers to success. State leaders can create stronger communities and a more prosperous state by funding colleges and universities adequately so they can provide a high-quality education while keeping student costs low. Schools can work harder to support students and remove roadblocks to graduation. Federal and state governments, schools, businesses and students themselves all have a part to play. Postsecondary education should be a shared responsibility, with shared gains for families, communities and the state.

Over the past century, the world has become increasingly more complex. Modern systems (i.e blockchain, internet of things (IoT), and global supply chains) are inherently difficult to comprehend due to their high degree of connectivity. Understanding the nature of complex systems becomes an acutely more critical skill set for managing socio-technical infrastructure systems. As existing education programs and technical analysis approaches fail to teach and describe modern complexities, resulting consequences have direct impacts on real-world systems. Complex systems are characterized by exhibiting nonlinearity, interdependencies, feedback loops, and stochasticity. Since these four traits are counterintuitive, those responsible for managing complex systems may struggle in identifying these underlying relationships and decision-makers may fail to account for their implications or consequences when deliberating systematic policies or interventions. This dissertation details the findings of a three-part study on applying complex systems modeling techniques to exemplar socio-technical infrastructure systems. In the research articles discussed hereafter, various modeling techniques are contrasted in their capacity for simulating and analyzing complex, adaptive systems. This research demonstrates the empirical value of a complex system approach as twofold: (i) the technique explains systems interactions which are often neglected or ignored and (ii) its application has the capacity for teaching systems thinking principles. These outcomes serve decision-makers by providing them with further empirical analysis and granting them a more complete understanding on which to base their decisions. The first article examines modeling techniques, and their unique aptitudes are compared against the characteristics of complex systems to establish which methods are most qualified for complex systems analysis. Outlined in the second article is a proof of concept piece on using an interactive simulation of the Los Angeles water distribution system to teach complex systems thinking skills for the improved management of socio-technical infrastructure systems. Lastly, the third article demonstrates the empirical value of this complex systems approach for analyzing infrastructure systems through the construction of a systems dynamics model of the Arizona educational-workforce system, across years 1990 to 2040. The model explores a series of dynamic hypotheses and allows stakeholders to compare policy interventions for improving educational and economic outcome measures.

Although situating itself at the core, the mainstream is not the center that embraces and draws the diverse nation together. Although attributing to itself a singleness of purpose and resolve, the mainstream is neither uniform nor powerful in its imperialism and hegemony. Although casting the periphery beyond the bounds of civility and religion, the mainstream derives its identity, its integrity, from its representation of the other. And despite its authorship of the central tenets of democracy, the mainstream has been silent on the publication of its creed. In fact, the margin has tested and ensured the guarantees of citizenship, and the margins have been the true defender of American democracy, equality, and liberty. From that vantage, we can see the margin as mainstream.

The Maryland Primary Care Program (MDPCP) is a key element of the Total Cost of Care (TCOC) All-Payer Model, an agreement between the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the state of Maryland. The MDPCP is a voluntary program that provides funding and support for the delivery of advanced primary care throughout the state. It allows primary care providers to play an increased role in the prevention and management of chronic disease, as well as in the prevention of unnecessary hospital utilization. As an important part of supporting providers in their care management efforts, the MDPCP will provide to participating practices risk scores of their attributed beneficiaries according to each patient’s risk of incurring a potentially avoidable hospitalization or emergency department (ED) visit. Accordingly, The Hilltop Institute, in conjunction with the Maryland Department of Health, has developed the Hilltop Pre-AH (Predicting Avoidable Hospitalizations) Model™ in order to operationalize these risk scores. These patient-level risk scores are provided to participating medical practices on a monthly basis via the MDPCP portal on the Chesapeake Regional Information System for our Patients (CRISP) unified landing page. This document aims to explain the intended use, technical implementation, and model performance of the Hilltop Pre-AH Model™ as of June 2020. It will be updated as future versions of the model become operational.

President Trump campaigned on “making America great again” through trade and immigration restrictions. I argue that it is difficult for policymakers to restrict both trade and immigration because of trade’s effects on business support for immigration. When trade is restricted, more low-skill intensive goods are made in the US, leading to more demand for low-skill immigration from businesses. As businesses are relatively powerful, we should expect immigration to open. Conversely, when trade opens, fewer low-skill intensive goods are made in the US, leading to the closure of the firms that produce these goods. This reduces demand for low-skill labor and, with it, the demand for low-skill immigration. As business demand for immigration recedes, policymakers restrict immigration to appease anti-immigrant groups. Using data on immigration and trade in the US, I show that this relationship has held over US history. At the end of the article I hypothesize several reasons why Trump’s tariffs are not leading to more demand for immigration due to their limited effects on trade and the job market.

Commuting imposes opportunity costs on travelers since those with long commutes have less time to participate in other activities. This paper examines how commute duration is associated with activity patterns. It utilizes a two-day time use survey administered in the United Kingdom in 2014 and 2015. Focusing on full-time employees and controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, we regress time spent engaging in 22 different activities on commute duration using OLS and Cragg two-part hurdle modeling. We separately test the effects of commute duration on activity participation for men versus women and for single persons versus persons in couples. We also report the subjective well-being (SWB), specifically the hedonic affect, associated with these activities as determined by using fixed-effects panel regression. The estimations suggest that commutes are associated with time constraints and entail trade-offs, with longer commutes being associated with significantly less time engaging in most of our activities including sleep, cooking, housework, shopping/accessing services, arts/entertainment activities, TV/music time, computer games and other computer use, visiting with others, sports/exercise/outdoor activities, hobbies, volunteering, and non-work travel. Those with longer commutes are found to tend to engage in more of two activities: work and eating out. The activities those with longer commutes tend to forego run the gamut from high-SWB to low-SWB. Given that the lowest-SWB activity in our sample is commuting itself, it appears as if the substitution of nearly any activity for commuting may bring emotional benefits. In all, the results suggest that longer commutes are associated with significant emotional costs.

We document that declining hours worked are the primary driver of widening inequality in the bottom half of the male labor earnings distribution in the United States over the past 52 years. This decline in hours is heavily concentrated in recessions: hours and earnings at the bottom fall sharply in recessions and do not fully recover in subsequent expansions. Motivated by this evidence, we build a structural model to explore the possibility that recessions cause persistent increases in inequality; that is, that the cycle drives the trend. The model features skill-biased technical change, which implies a trend decline in low-skill wages relative to the value of non-market activities. With this adverse trend in the background, recessions imply a potential double-whammy for low skilled men. This group is disproportionately likely to experience unemployment, which further reduces skills and potential earnings via a scarring effect. As unemployed low skilled men give up job search, recessions generate surges in non-participation. Because non-participation is highly persistent, earnings inequality remains elevated long after the recession ends.

This study (1) provides annual population estimates of fatal and nonfatal injury incidence rates for older adults for 2004–2017; (2) determines if trends differ by whether the injury was fatal or nonfatal, a fall or nonfall injury, and for nonfatal injuries, minor or serious; and (3) investigates whether trends vary by age, sex, and race. Methods This study used National Vital Statistics System and National Health Interview Survey data covering the population of adults aged ≥65 years for 2004–2017. Fatal injury incidence rates were estimated using negative binomial models; nonfatal injury incidence rates were estimated using Poisson models. All models compared overall risk and trend differences by year, age, sex, and race, and interactions between year and age, sex, and race. All analyses were conducted in 2019. Results Fatal injury incidence was stable over time, but this apparent stability masked a 35% increase in fatal falls and a 17% decrease in fatal nonfall injuries. Increases in fall-related deaths were concentrated among those aged ≥85 years, men, and white older adults. The trend in fatal falls accelerated over time for those aged ≥85 years and white older adults. By contrast, there was a large increase in nonfatal injury incidence, occurring across all injury types. Nonfatal injury risk grew with age and was higher for women and white older adults, but trends did not vary by age, sex, or race. Conclusions Large increases in fatal and nonfatal injuries underscore the urgency of national implementation of fall prevention programs and expanding fall prevention efforts to more general injury prevention.