When the 1910 PUMS was originally conceived and released it was remarkable for its size and comprehensiveness, and for the technology used to construct it. With a sample density of approximately 1-in-250, it was more than three times as large as the earlier 1900 PUMS, in relative terms. For the first time, not only was there a nationally representative sample, but it was also possible to study significant subgroups of the population, as Watkins (1994) showed. Populous geographical areas were well represented, with 15,599 cases for Texas, 36,027 for New York State, and large numbers for major cities, including 19,081 cases for New York City, 6,081 for Philadelphia, and 8,584 for Chicago.Despite the impressive overall size of the sample and the ability to use it to study carefully selected subgroups within the population, there is research for which it was not designed. It is not possible, for example, to analyze the characteristics of small populations within the United States in 1910, if it is also necessary to subdivide them into a significant number of additional subgroups. This turned out to be an important research consideration when studying Americans of African and Hispanic origin in 1910, which led two research groups to design and construct oversamples of the 1910 PUMS, which could be used for the detailed study of those groups. This article describes those samples in general terms. Fuller discussion can be found in the IPUMS documentation (Gutmann et al. 1998), as well as in Gutmann, Frisbie and Blanchard (1999) and in Morgan and Ewbank (1990).

In this article, we describe for the first time results of a successful effort to obtain much higher quality data about the Hispanic population of the United States in 1910 than has been previously available.... Our report...is based on a new supplement to the frequently used Public Use Sample of the 1910 census.... Our goal is to present here the first serious description of the Hispanic population based on these data and to show how our characterization of the Hispanic population differs from what is already known.

It is now well documented that the gender wage gap declined substantially in the 1980s, despite rising overall wage inequality. While Blau and Kahn (JoLE 1997) attribute much of this improvement to gains in women's relative labor market experience and other observable characteristics, a substantial part of the decline in the gender wage gap remains unexplained, and may be due to reduced discrimination against women in the labor market. This paper tests the hypothesis (based on Becker 1957) that increased globalization in the 1980s forced employers to reduce costly discrimination against women and thus accounted for part of the "unexplained" improvement in the gender pay gap.To test this hypothesis, we calculate the change in the residual gender wage gap across industries (as well as cities) over time using CPS data from 1977-1994, and test the correlation between this measure and changes in import shares. The wage data are further broken down by the type of market structure in an industry, i.e. whether the industry is concentrated or competitive. Since concentrated industries face little competitive pressure to reduce discrimination, an increase in competition from increased trade should lead to a reduction in the residual gender wage gap. We use a difference-in-differences approach to compare the change in the residual gender wage gap in concentrated versus unconcentrated sectors, using the latter as a control for changes in the gender wage gap that are unrelated competitive pressures. The findings indicate that increased competition through trade did contribute to the narrowing of the gender wage gap, suggesting that, at least in this sense, trade may benefit women relative to men.

Prior to passage of the Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997, the United States tax code encouraged housing consumption through its treatment of capital gains on primary residence sales. The former capital gains policy encouraged housing consumption by reducing or eliminating capital gains tax liabilities on primary home sales for households that sold one residence and then purchased another residence of sufficient value. The former policy substantially affected the consumption decisions of many households that migrated between metropolitan areas. In particular, most households that migrated from areas with higher housing costs to areas with lower housing costs consumed more housing as a result of the policy. This dissertation focuses on how the former capital gains policy affected the housing consumption of households that migrated between metropolitan areas during the period 1985 through 1990. Consumption and welfare effects of the former capital gains policy are simulated using the 1990 Public Use Micro Samples. Simulation results suggest the former policy may be responsible for upwards of one hundred billion dollars of American housing stock. An empirical investigation reveals that households that moved from areas with high housing costs to areas with low housing consumed substantially more housing than other households. A large portion of this increased consumption may have been due to the former policy. Because housing is a long-lived asset, the effects of the former policy will be part of the American landscape for years to come.

During a technology takeoff, what effects are visible in the data on employment relationships and labor markets? In particular, can we find evidence for the hypothesis that there is bidding for certain types of employees which raises income inequality among workers overall during a technology takeoff? By technology takeoff we mean the response of firms and entrepreneurs to a new technology, analogous to a gold rush. When technologies of production are evolving, the contributions of different types of workers may vary more than when technology is stable, because some skills, talents, or experiences may suddenly be in short supply. This dissertation explores that conjecture from many angles. Can this effect be seen in data on earnings? Can we model an intuitively plausible mechanism by which it would be brought about? And is there a useful contrast between this proposition and the view built into much of the research literature, that information technology imparts a skill bias, expanding inequalities more permanently? This document proposes a dissertation made up of several approaches to these problems. The first chapter models the skill and ability differences that could drive the effects described, and in two chapters we look for evidence of temporary earnings dispersion during technology takeoffs.

Economic inequality is higher today than at any time in the past sixty years, measured by both the wage structure and wealth inequality. But the comparison between 1939 and 1999 is largely made out of necessity, since the 1940 U.S. population census was the first to inquire of wage and salary income and education.In this paper we address what the returns to skill were in the United States prior to 1940 and piece together a full century of skill premiums, the dispersion of the wage structure, and the returns to formal schooling. We examine the long run history of distribution in the United States through the lens of the wage structure and the returns to schooling and are able to do so because of the recent retrieval of a remarkable and unique document - the 1915 Iowa State Census. We also use several less-obscure materials but ones, nonetheless, that have remained dormant. Using all of these sources, we find that the wage structure narrowed at several moments in the first half of the century, both coinciding with major economic disruptions brought about by war, inflation, and union activity. The returns to education were in fact higher in 1914 than in 1939, and the enormous expansion in secondary schooling was a contributing factor.

Suggests some possible uses of the 1860 and 1870 United States Censuses of Population samples and provides background information on the construction of the samples and their availability. Applications of the samples for historical research; Particular strengths of the 1860 and 1870 samples; Versions of the 1860 and 1870 samples.

We present the first estimates of the returns to years of schooling before 1940 using a large sample of men and women, employed in a variety of sectors and occupations, from the Iowa State Census of 1915. We find that the returns to a year of high school, and to a year of college, were substantial in 1915 - about 11 percent for all males and in excess of 12 percent for young males. Some of the return to years of high school and college arose because more education allowed individuals to enter lucrative white-collar jobs. But we also find sizable educational wage differentials within the white- and blue-collar sectors. Returns to education above the 'common school' grades were substantial even within the agricultural sector. Given the high overall rate of return to secondary schooling, it is no wonder that the 'high school movement' took root in America around 1910, even in agricultural areas such as Iowa. Census data for 1940, 1950, and 1960 are used to show that returns to years of schooling were greater in 1915 than in 1940. We conclude that the return to education decreased sometime between 1915 and 1940 and then declined again during the 1940s.

The Historical Census Project at the University of Minnesota has recently added microdata samples for the 1860 and 1870 federal censuses to the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, which is a database with information on about 1% of the US population from 1850 to 1990. These new samples enhance the usefulness of the existing 1850 and 1880 microdata samples and complete the continuous series of population information from 1850 to 1990.

Between 1910 and 1930 a precipitous decline in the infant mortality rate occurred that signaled the beginning of the American Mortality Transition. Until the last decade, explanations for this remarkable demographic event centered on macro-level factors, such as advances in agriculture and transportation, improvements in the public health infrastructure (e.g. sewage disposal and water supply protection), and progress in the science and technology of medicine, particularly the development of innoculation for communicable diseases. However, recent causal reappraisals employing more advanced analytical techniques and newly-available demographic evidence emphasize the importance of fundamental changes in the household-level health behaviors (particularly maternal behaviors) in reducing infant deaths. During the early twentieth century the U.S. Children's Bureau pursued a campaign to reduce infant mortality through maternal education and other prevention activities. This campaign built on the applied research and health promotion work of the settlement house women who established the bureau and comprised its early leadership. Until now, though, direct linkages between these coincident efforts and the reduction in infant mortality have been difficult to establish. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis of Children's Bureau reports and demographic analysis of the 1910 and 1920 Public Use Microdata Sample census data, we link the philosophy, passion and science of the bureau's early leadership to new evidence and conclusions about the remarkable improvements in infant survival that occurred, not coincidentally, at the apex of the bureau's Progressive Era activities.

The increase in earnings inequality in the U.S. is now well documented1. Over a period of nearly 20 years, the returns to both education and experience have continued their steady rise. As a result, more educated workers gained relative to less skilled workers, whose real wages fell not only in relative terms, but also in absolute terms.The question which this paper addresses is whether these increases in the price of skill have led to an offsetting increase in supply of skilled workers, which would have dampened the growth in inequality. While it might be assumed that the experience composition of labor force is largely driven by demographics, it would be more surprising if the educational composition of labor force was not responding to this nearly two decade long increase in the returns to college. The question we ask is whether the skill intensity of recent cohorts (who have made educational decisions during the period of rising returns to college) show any evidence of responding to the rising skill premium, even with a substantial lag.