This paper examines segregation in American cities from 1890 to 1990. From 1890 to 1940, ghettos were born as blacks migrated to urban areas and cities developed vast expanses filled with almost entirely black housing. From 1940 to 1970, black migration continued and the physical areas of the ghettos expanded. Since 1970, there has been a decline in segregation as blacks have moved into previously all-white areas of cities and suburbs. Across all these time periods there is a strong positive relation between urban population or density and segregation. Data on house prices and attitudes toward integration suggest that in the mid-twentieth century, segregation was a product of collective actions taken by whites to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. By 1990, the legal barriers enforcing segregation had been replaced by decentralized racism, where whites pay more than blacks to live in predominantly white areas.

This study explores the effect of farm value on retirement decisions of farm owners in the early twentieth century. The average farm value per acre of county, as of either 1900 or 1910, and the growth rate over the decade had a strong positive effect on the probability of retirement of farm owners in 1910. Farm owners were more responsive to a change in farm value if it was not produced by a shift in the farmland productivity, which raised the opportunity cost of retirement. I argue that the rapid growth in the value of farm properties between 1900 and 1910 was a major force behind the decline in the labor force participation rate of males ages 65 and over during the same period.

How extensive is the 'brain drain,' and which countries and regions are most strongly affected by it? This article estimates the extent of migration, by level of education, from developing countries to the United States and other OECD countries.

A Traditional explanation for the fall in the labor force participation of older males in the era of industrialization is that it was in part produced by the decline in agriculture. A number of recent studies rejected this view based on the result that farmers were no less likely to retire than were nonfarmers. An examination of a longer period, however, shows that farmers were less likely to retire than were nonfarmers, as the conventional view suggests. Only the first decade of the twentieth century, which the revisionist view drew evidence from, exhibits the opposite pattern. This peculiarity of the years between 1900 to 1910 is likely to have resulted from the unusually high appreciation of farm property during the same period that would have stimulated retirement of farmers. According to the counterfactual LFPR of older males that would have resulted had there been no decline in the relative size of agriculture since 1820, the decrease in the labor force employed in farming accounts for about 20 percent of the fall in the LFPR of men 60 and older between 1880 and 1940.

I present here estimates of the number of white and non-white workers by sex and for selected age categories in the United States at census dates in the nineteenth century.... By providing the same age and sex categorizations for the white workforce as for the free and slave components of the nonwhite workforce, the figures can be combined to produce a time series for the non-white workforce, including free and slave, or the free workforce, including white and nonwhite workers, or both...

This research note contrasts 19th- and 20th-century New York City age- and gender-specific offender rates. Earlier work has established that there is a peakedness in age-specific offending between 20 and 30, whereas more recent data show a much younger high offending rate. In sharp contrast, the 19th-century New York data show a relatively flat distribution from the early 20s onward. This suggests that the current age rates are a new phenomenon and that young offenders are a separate, nontraditional group, overlaid onto the more traditional age groups.

This thesis studies the implications of the convergence of factor returns on earnings inequality within theoretical models of trade, migration, and economic growth and development. The implications of different models are tested empirically by using U.S. census data in 1959 and 1979. As the convergence of the factor returns is related to the comparison of the real earnings of the similar workers, one has to adjust for regional cost of living differentials. Regional cost of living indices are partly determined by locally produced goods and services. Gross housing rents are used to adjust for regional cost of living differentials. About 6 to 7 percent of the non-south/south differential in average earnings can be explained by the lower cost of living in south. Studies that do not adjust for regional cost of living differentials tend to overestimate the non-south/south earnings differential. When only one type of worker is identified as an input in the production, convergence of the factor returns through trade, migration, and growth and economic development have the same implications as far as the earnings inequality and the average earnings are concerned. However, when there are more than one type of workers in the production, the implications of the convergence of the factor returns on the average earnings and the earnings inequality will be determined by the evolution of the human capital investments.

Secondary school education greatly expanded in the United Statesfrom 1910 to 1940, setting its schooling attainment apart from thatof all other countries. Barely 10 percent of youth were high schoolgraduates in 1910, but by the mid 1930s the median youth had ahigh school diploma. In some regions, by the 1930s enrollmentand graduation rates rose to levels that were as high as they wouldbe two decades later. The issue addressed here concerns the economicimpact of the large increase in the supply of educated labor.Evidence is presented concerning the sharp decline in the wagepremium to ordinary white-collar workers. With the expansion ofthe high school, large numbers of Americans competed for positionsin the coveted white-collar sector. Although the return to ayear of high school remained considerable on the eve of WorldWar II, egalitarianism had evened the playing field for a substantialsegment of Americans.

Census data show that the ratio of black to white unemployment rates, currently in excess of 2:1, was small or nonexistent before 1940, widened dramatically during the 1940s and 1950s, and widened again in the 1980s. The authors decompose changes in the unemployment gap over the years 1880-1990 to identify the separate contributions of changes in observable worker characteristics and shifts in labor demand. Nearly all of the widening of the gap during the 1940s and 1950s can be attributed to regional shifts of workers and declining demand in markets where black workers were concentrated. After 1970, improvements in the relative educational status of black workers would have narrowed the unemployment gap slightly, but demand shifts adverse to black workers more than canceled out these gains.

What is more important--race or class--in determining the socioeconomic success of the blacks and whites born since the civil rights triumphs of the 1960s? When compared to whites, African Americans complete less formal schooling, work fewer hours at a lower rate of pay and are more likely to give birth to a child out of wedlock and to rely on welfare. Are these differences attributable to race per se, or are they the result of differences in socioeconomic background between the two groups? Being Black, Living in the Red demonstrates that many differences between blacks and whites stem not from race but from economic inequalities that have accumulated over the course of American history. Property ownership--as measured by net worth--reflects this legacy of economic oppression. The racial discrepancy in wealth holdings leads to advantages for whites in the form of better schools, more desirable residences, higher wages, and more opportunities to save, invest, and thereby further their economic advantages. Dalton Conley shows how factoring parental wealth into a re-conceptualization of class can lead to a different future for race policy in the United States. As it currently stands, affirmative action programs primarily address racial diversity in schooling and work--areas that Conley contends generate paradoxical results with respect to racial equity. Instead he suggests an affirmative action policy that fosters minority property accumulation, thereby encouraging long-term wealth equity, or one that--while continuing to address schooling and work--is based on social class as defined by family wealth levels rather than on race.

Since 1890, every U.S. census but one has asked about the language characteristics of the U.S. population. This almost uninterrupted data series, however, has been shaped by contemporaneous presumptions about the ties between language and ethnicity, the likelihood of proficiency in English among various subgroups, and practical constraints. I describe shifts across censuses in the phrasing of questions about language, the coding of responses, and the subpopulations for which the questions were asked and the results were published. I then describe the data generated by these items and discuss their interpretation.

Since 1890, every U.S. census but one has asked about the language characteristics of the U.S. population. This almost uninterrupted data series, however, has been shaped by contemporaneous presumptions about the ties between language and ethnicity, the likelihood of proficiency in English among various subgroups, and practical constraints. I describe shifts across censuses in the phrasing of questions about language, the coding of responses, and the subpopulations for which the questions were asked and the results were published. I then describe the data generated by these items and discuss their interpretation. I conclude with a summary of the major insights and limitations of a century's worth of data.

This paper summarizes the broad foundations of the changing nature of parenthood by examining trends in coresidence with children under age 15. Our study uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) to provide a portrait of demographic parenthood in the United States over the 19th and 20th centuries. In describing changes in parenthood over the past 110 years, we distinguish between those living with own children and those living with other children. We focus in particular on changes in gender patterns of coresidential parenthood and changes in the likelihood that divorced men and women live with children. We also examine the impact of the baby boom on parenting. Our findings support a recasting of ongoing discussions of the parental roles of American men and women by shifting the historical demographic focus from biological transitions to the social aspects of parenting.

Most examinations of poverty in the United States have typically focused either on how broad economic trends and social welfare policy affect the size of the population living in poverty or the socio-demographic characteristics of those in poverty. Almost no research has examined immigrations impact on the incidence of poverty in the United States. This report looks at the composition of persons living in poverty in 1979, 1989, and 1997 in order to evaluate the effect of immigration policy on the size and growth of the poor population (poor and poverty are used synonymously). The findings indicate that despite a strong economy over much of this period, the poverty rate for persons in immigrant headed households not only has remained high, but actually has increased significantly in the last two decades. As a result, immigration has become a major factor in the size and growth of poverty.